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With the prevailing profile of the course, there are two main subject areas of this course:

  • Subject area 1: Reliability assessment methods with focus on the application with safety-critical systems (approximately 60-70% weight)
  • Subject area 2: Maintenance optimization models and methods which have a broader application area (approximately 30%-40%)

Lectured topics within these three subject areas are indicated in the lecture plan below. Textbook for subject area 1 is  Reliability of Safety-Critical Systems: Theory and Applications, while the compendium, Maintenance optimization lecture notes
is available for subject area 2.

A collection of formulas is updated after each lecture. This collection may be brought to the exam.

 

WeekDate

 

Subject
area

Lectured topicsMotivationLecturerTutorials
3419 & 20.8All

1st hour:

  • Introduction to the course
  • Organization of student groups
    (3 persons per group) 

2nd-3rd hours

  • Introduction to two case studies
  • Group work and summary in
    plenum

Inform the students about the course objectives, intended learning outcomes, and practicalities.

  • Give a more thorough introduction to two systems (A SIS and a windmill) where the lectured models and methods
    may be applicable.
  • Explain and discuss the technologies involved, with focus on attributes like
    reliability, availability, maintenance, and safety
  • Group work and summary in plenum

Mary Ann

and Jørn

  • Introduction to
    applicable
    software tools:
    Maple

    (GRIF software for solving PetriNets will be covered by Yiliu Liu later in relation to his lectures). 
3526.-27.81

Safety-critical systems:
Key concepts and
requirements

(Textbook: chapter 2,3, and 7) 

IEC 61508 is a key standard on design of safety-critical systems, when the technology used include electrical,
electronic, and programmable electronic systems. Many authority regulations Petroleum, railway, nuclear,
automotive, etc) refer to this standard, or standards that are under the "umbrella" of this standard.
The standard introduces several key concepts including equipment under control (EUC), safety integrity level (SIL),
safety lifecycle, functional safety, risk reduction factor, and many more.  Safety design principles, such as
fail-safe design and architectural constraints, are also discussed.

Mary Ann
  • Problems Chapter 1: 2,5,8,9
  • Problems Chapter 2: 1, 11, 12, 19

See http://www.ntnu.edu/web/ross/books/sis/problems

362.-3.91

Safety-critical systems:
Development of SIL
requirements

(chapter 2, plus supplemented material:
IEC 61511-3) 

The mentioned IEC standard(s) require a structured process for defining SIL requirements. Methods like layers of protection
analysis (LOPA) and risk graph are often used for this purpose. Risk graph is used with many applications, such as for
machinery and process industry, whereas LOPA is mainly used in the process industry. In the oil and gas industry,
for example, it is common to have LOPA-sessions/workshops in an early planning of new systems. A special case of defining
SIL requirements is the minimum SIL, advocated in a Norwegian guideline for offshore oil and gas facility, Norsk Olje og Gass
guideline 070. This approach builds on principles called GALE or GAMAB. 
Mary Ann
  • Problems chapter 2: 22, 27 (no 27 is NEW and is included in a new version of the problems booklet uploaded on it's learning).

See http://www.ntnu.edu/web/ross/books/sis/problems

379.-10.91Safety-critical systems:
Quantification of reliability
for systems operating
on demand - Extending the
simplified formulas
(Textbook chapter 8) 

Students that take this course are familiar with simplified formulas for calculating the average probability of failure on demand (PFD).
The deriving of these formulas is not repeated here, but extensions are discussed, including:

  • IEC 61508-6 formulas
  • PDS method
  • if time: Fault tree analysis (compensating for the Schwartz' inequality)
Mary Ann
3816.-17.91

Safety-critical systems:
Quantification of reliability
for systems operating
on demand - introducing
PetriNets 

(Textbook chapter 5 and 8)

PetriNets is an alternative approach for calculating the the the average probability of failure on demand (PFD).
PetriNets have not been much used for this particular purpose, but the approach is widely used in many
other application areas such as the modeling of communication and software. In our context,
PetriNets have got increased attention as the newest version of IEC 61508 and a new technical guideline published by ISO, the
ISO/TR 12489) mention and give application examples.  

Yiliu

(Mary Ann
at ESREL) 

  • Selected
    problems
3923.-24.91Safety-critical systems: Modeling
of CCFs and determining
of the value of the beta
factor.
(Textbook chapter 10) 

Common cause failures (CCFs) are often the main contributor to the probability of failure for redundant systems. The students
are already familiar with the beta factor model, and this model is therefore not lectured here. The focus in this lecture
will be on:

  • Main attributes of CCFs, including root causes and coupling factors
  • The multiple-beta factor model and its application with e.g. the PDS method.
  • Methods used to determine the value of beta (checklists and similar)
Mary Ann
  • Problems chapter 10: 3, NEW PROBLEMS: Related to determining the value of beta, and to the interpretation of the C_MooN factor.
4030.9-1.101Safety-critical systems:
Quantification of reliability
for systems operating on
demand with
focus on partial and imperfect
testing
(Textbook chapter 11) 
It is not always realistic that the proof tests and the associated repair actions are "perfect", meaning
that the system is restored to an as good as new state after each test. One reason may be that it
is not safe to simulate a real "demand" (would you test fire detectors by putting fire to a room?).
The simulated test (pressing a test-button) may not be so extensive, and some failures
may be left undiscovered also after the test. Another reason may be that it is not desired to
carry out a perfect test. Testing of valves, for example, require that the valve is operated
from opened to closed position (or visa versa), but this may require a full stop of the plant.
Instead, it may be suggested to replace some perfect tests with partial tests, so that the valve
is just operated some %, and then returned to its initial position. This lecture focus on how to account
for such factors in the quantification of PFD. 
Mary Ann
    • Problems Chapter 4: 3,4,7

See http://www.ntnu.edu/web/ross/books/sis/problems

417.-8.101Safety-critical systems:
Quantification of reliability
for systems operating in the high
demand mode
(Textbook chapter 9) 
Not all safety-critical systems operate on demand. For example, many machinery safety functions
are always or so often demanded that the PFD is no longer a useful reliability measure. Another
example is railway signaling systems controlling the setting of light signals and position of
rails switches. In this case, another reliability measure is suggested in standards like IEC 61508,
called failure frequency (PFH). This lecture explains how the PFH is calculated for typical
system architectures. 
Mary Ann
    • Problems Chapter 9: 1, NEW problem on application of IEC 61508 formulas.

See http://www.ntnu.edu/web/ross/books/sis/problems

4214.-15.101Safety-critical systems:
Quantification of spurious trips
(Textbook chapter 10) 

A fail-safe design of a safety-critical system favors a transition to the safe state, which in most
cases is to stop the system being protected. For example, a failure in a railway
signaling system will usually result in a stop of all train traffic, while waiting on an investigation
of why the failure occurred. So, often the result is "the more safe, the more disturbances caused by
the system. It is therefore of interest to also quantify what we refer to as the spurious trip rate,
to ensure that this rate is balanced against the PFD or PFH. This lecture presents primarily the
analytical formulas for quantifying PFH. 

Mary Ann
  • To be announced
4321-22.102Spare-part optimizationSpare parts may be costly to have on the stock, but at the same time it is costly not to have a spare part available
when it is needed. This topic concern how to calculate the probability of running out of spares, using simple formulas
and Markov analyses. The use of PetriNets for this purpose is also shown. This topic may not be some relevant for very 
specialized systems, where it is not possible to acquire a spare within short time. For a manufacturer that develops
products, such as sensors, in a large scale to e.g. the oil and gas industry, it may be relevant to find the optimal number
of spare parts for warranty and repair services. 

Yiliu

 
4427&28.102Maintenance interval optimization and related issues

The main objective of the lectures on maintenance interval optimization is to understand a set of classical mathematical models for maintenance interval optimization. In the introduction course in maintenance four failure models were introduced, (i) gradual failure progression, (ii) fast failure progression, (iii) non-observable failure progression and (iv) shock type failures. For all four situations the standard cost function to minimize will be developed. Essential in the modelling is the understanding of the effective failure rate¸ and how to calculate it given reliability parameters like MTTF, aging parameter, PF-interval and so on.

In this lecture the classical age, block, and minimal repair policies are introduced as a motivation for the modelling. Next we discuss how these models align to the general modelling framework, and the concept of effective failure rate.

Special emphasise will be paid on the calculation of the effective failure rate in various situations. This involves use of renewal theory, use of the law of total probability, and Markov methods.

JørnSelected problems from http://frigg.ivt.ntnu.no/ross/elearning/maintop/exercises/
454&5.112Maintenance interval optimization and related issues (continued)The second lecture on interval optimization completes the presentation of the four failure models introduced. In the standard cost functions the cost of preventive maintenance is fixed, and not influenced by other tasks. In reality preventive maintenance cost could be reduced by coordination of various maintenance tasks. Models for maintenance grouping are introduced to formulate the optimization problem in such situations. A distinction is made between static and dynamic grouping. The optimization problem now deals both with forming the groups, and determining when to execute each group of activity. Some heuristics are introduced for selected situations.JørnSelected problems from http://frigg.ivt.ntnu.no/ross/elearning/maintop/exercises/
4611&12.112Degradation modeling and condition based maintenance

This lecture is an introduction to condition based maintenance, that is to say maintenance which is based on a degradation indicator of the system. It mainly concerns preventive maintenance actions which are triggered before failure, in order to avoid failure costs. This kind of maintenance actions are relevant when the failure cost is high compared with the maintenance costs and when at least one degradation indicator is available for the system. This lecture aims at i) giving an overview of useful tools to model degradation (especially continuous state space degradation, e.g. crack propagation), ii) showing how such models can be used for failures prognosis and condition based maintenance optimization.

 

Anne

 
47

18.&19.11

N/AStudent presentations
(also using tutorial hours) 
Students get the possibility to reflect on the lectured
topics and in particular to see how these are related to
their specialization project, and how they may be
applicable for their master project. 
  
4826.11 Summary (in tutorial hours, due
to IPK traveling on 24-25.11) 
 Mary Ann 
       
       
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