Etikk i
praksis. Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics (2024), 18(2), 35-47
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From consent to authorization: New concepts for solving new problems?
Bjørn Hofmann
The
turn from traditional paternalism and
towards patient autonomy has made informed
consent a key concept for medical ethics and
health legislation. However, informed
consent has been attacked for a wide range
of shortcomings, both conceptually and
theoretically, as well as practically.
Vilhjálmur Árnason has suggested an
alternative to informed consent, i.e., to
give authorizations. Vilhjálmur1
has been supported by other researchers, but
the authorization approach has not been
elaborated in any greater detail or come to
widespread use in bioethics. This article
describes and discusses Vilhjálmur’s and
other scholars’ approach to authorizations
and reflects on why this approach deserves
more attention than previously given,
especially for addressing the extended
challenges emerging from biological sciences
generating a wide range of person-related
biological entities.
Introduction Informed
consent is a key rule under the principle of
autonomy widely used both in clinical practice
and in medical research (Faden &
Beauchamp, 1986). While the rule is crucial
both in medical ethics and legislation, it has
been attacked for a wide range of
shortcomings, both conceptually and
theoretically, as well as practically. Key
challenges are identified amongst each of its
key features, i.e., understanding, capacity to
consent, and voluntariness: when are we
providing sufficient information to ascertain
understanding? How can we appropriately assess
and ascertain competency to consent? How can
we assess and assure voluntariness? Moreover,
the relational characteristic of human beings
and the many human biases question the premise
of human rational decision-making (Kahneman,
2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 2013; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974). One area
where the rule of informed consent has been
particularly challenged is biobank research
(Solbakk et al., 2009). Large repositories of
biological specimens combined with extensive
health data information systems provide new
opportunities far beyond the initial purpose
of the collection. This has raised three
crucial questions: 1) Is informed consent
suitable for biobank research at all? (Solbakk
et al., 2009), 2) How to apply biological
material for future research beyond the scope
of the previously given consent (for other or
limited purposes)? and 3) How to design
procedures for obtaining self-determination
and protection for donors of biological
material that includes unpredictable future
research? Constructing consent The
basic challenges emerging with biobank
research have been addressed by modifying
consent procedures or to provide new
conceptions of consent, such as broad consent
(Hansson et al., 2006; Manson, 2019b;
Mikkelsen et al., 2019), wide consent (Vellón
& Martin, 2011), open consent (Hallinan
& Friedewald, 2015; Lunshof et al., 2008),
dynamic consent (Kaye et al., 2015),
meta-consent (Ploug & Holm, 2017),
presumed consent (Allen & McNamara, 2011),
restricted consent, extended consent (Devereux
et al., 2016), tiered consent (Nembaware et
al., 2019), blanket consent (Brewin, 1997;
Caulfield, 2002), waived consent (Veatch,
2007), and trusted consent (Boniolo et al.,
2012; Brückner et al., 2023). Table 1 provides
an overview of most referred types of consent
with some pros and cons.
As
illustrated in Table 1 each of the consent
forms seem to solve some of the challenges,
but also to introduce new controversies (Bruns
& Winkler, 2024 Online first; Manson,
2019a). As stated by Wiertz and Boldt, “[n]one
of the consent models satisfies fully both the
demands of the individual rights perspective
and of the perspective of research as a public
good” (Wiertz & Boldt, 2022). Hence,
constructing concepts of consent that are
applicable to biobank (use and research),
future health data analysis, turned out not to
be an easy task and no consensus has been
reached. The
three basic requirements for consent still
seem to be challenging to obtain, i.e.,
understanding, competency, and voluntariness.
Many health services cannot be adequately
provided without the gathering of information
or biological material (voluntariness) and the
services are provided to persons with reduced
capacity to consent, e.g., when in pain,
unconscious, or vulnerable. However, it is the
unavailability of information regarding future
use of biological material and associated data
at the time of consent that has gained most
attention (Bruns & Winkler, 2024 Online
first). One
alternative approach to address these issues
suggested by Vilhjálmur is to apply
authorizations for the biobank research.
Authorization
Vilhjálmur
has suggested to apply an explicit written
authorization for entering data from health
databases into genetic research (Vilhjálmur,
2005a; Vilhjálmur, 2004): “I … spell out an
alternative way to obtain consent for
participation in database research. This
alternative, which I call an informed
authorisation, is to strike a balance between
protecting the interests of the participants
in the database and paving the way for this
new type of genetic research”. Even more “I
describe an idea of a written authorization
based on general information about intended
research as an alternative to informed consent
and presumed consent for the use of healthcare
information. I also propose a more restricted
authorization as an alternative to informed
consent and open consent to the use of genetic
information in database research” (Vilhjálmur,
2005a; Vilhjálmur, 2004). This
implies that the person must be informed about
“the conditions for use of the data, such as
how the research will be regulated, how they
will be connected to other data, who will have
access to the information, how privacy will be
secured, and that they will only be used for
described health care purposes. Participants
would be told that they and/or their proxies
will be regularly informed about the research
practice and that they can at any time
withdraw from particular research projects. In
this way, the emphasis on a one time initial
consent is rejected in favor of a dynamic
dialogical process between researchers and
participants” (Vilhjálmur, 2011). In
particular, the authorization encompasses
which information about the person that will
be stored; how privacy will be secured; how
the information will be connected to other
data; who will have access to the information;
in what context the information will be used
and for what purposes; how
consent for genetic research will be obtained;
the foreseeable risks and benefits of
participation; the regulation of the research
on the data; and the right to withdraw at any
time (Vilhjálmur, 2004). According
to Vilhjálmur, the authorization model
“enables active scientific citizenship because
it emphasizes the creation of conditions or
opportunities for citizens to reflect on their
participation in scientific research. Contrary
to the protective policy of specific informed
consent, these conditions for participants’
deliberation do not come at the cost of a
flexible biobank research.” (Vilhjálmur,
2009). With
this Vilhjálmur tries to “strike a balance
between a researcher’s need for flexibility
and the ethical demand for protection of
participants’ interests. The main thrust of
these proposals, which have different
emphasis, is that participants should be asked
to authorize the use of their data for
described health care research” (Vilhjálmur,
2011). According
to Vilhjálmur, authorization requires careful
communication, support, and building trust:
“Communication does not only convey
information, it also provides support and thus
meets the needs for counseling and comfort
many patients have” (Vilhjálmur, 2011). This
finds support in Caulfield, arguing that
authorization allows participants “to
meaningfully act on their continuing interests
in their health information” (Caulfield et
al., 2003). According to Vilhjálmur, the
objective is “to create more informed or
educated citizens who do not have to rely
exclusively on expert knowledge but can use it
in their deliberations about research
participation” (Vilhjálmur, 2009). Vilhjálmur
is quite clear on the relationship between
authorization and consent: “I argue that this
demand for informed consent is neither
suitable nor desirable” in the case of
handling genetic health data and that
“authorization is in the spirit of informed
consent, but it is far more general and open
and should, therefore, not be confused with
it” (Vilhjálmur, 2004, p.45). It
may be argued that authorization resembles
broad consent (or dynamic specific consent) as
the content of the authorization is open for
future changes. However, there is both a
conceptual and didactic difference. Consent
requires at least understanding, competency,
and voluntariness. For many of the types of
research and clinical practice the types of
consent listed in Table 1 do not satisfy the
understanding and/or the voluntariness clause,
and per definition the consent requirements.
Hence, they are not consent (Hofmann, 2009).
Accordingly, authorization does not give the
impression of being something it is not, i.e.,
consent. Moreover, by being more specific
about its uncertainties (about future use and
implications), authorization is more clear on
future needs for interaction (updates) and is
more educative. Etymologically,
the term authorization stems from Medieval
Latin (auctōrizāre) and relates to being an
author, and as such highlights (the role of)
agency. According to the Oxford English
Dictionary, to authorize is “to give official
permission for or formal approval to (an
action, undertaking, etc.)” and “to give (a
person or agent) legal or formal authority (to
do something)” (https://www.oed.com/dictionary/authorize_v?tl=true#33136136). In
Faden and Beauchamp’s seminal work on informed
consent (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986), consent
is defined in terms of authorization: “An
informed consent is an autonomous action by a
subject or a patient that authorizes a
professional either to involve the subject in
research or to initiate a medical plan for the
patient (or both)” (Faden & Beauchamp,
1986, p.278). Hence, authorization is
conceptually connected to consent. It is
therefore not radically different, but has the
potential to cover much of the ethical ground
that informed consent is to encompass.
Additionally, it does not give the guise of
being something it is not, i.e., consent. In
authorization you explicitly can address
future situations where you do not satisfy
conditions that do not qualify as consent. Moreover,
the suggestion to use authorizations is very
much in line with other research, e.g., with
Henry Greely’s proposal to elicit permissions
to unforeseen research uses of human tissue
samples and health information (Greely, 1999)
and can also be related to Tristam
Engelhardt’s “principle of permission”
(Engelhardt Jr, 1996). While
Vilhjálmur suggested using authorizations
specific for entering information from the
Health Sector Database (HSD) to a central
research database, the conception of
authorization appears to be applicable in a
broader context. Accordingly, others have,
inspired by Vilhjálmur, suggested to apply
“conditioned authorization” for biobank
research in general (Hofmann et al., 2009).
Conditioned
authorization for biobank research The prospective consequences with
respect to risks and benefits must be
addressed, in particular measures to secure
confidentiality and privacy with respect to
the material and information that stems from
it. Identifiability must be explicitly
addressed as well as procedures for recontact
and return of research results that are of
vital importance for the person (and/or
relatives). Additionally, present and
potential future handling of connecting
material to other sources of information
(coupling), e.g., who would be responsible for
handling of information and for possible
breaches of confidentiality, as well as who is
expected to foresee or regulate future
coupling. Moreover, CA must address the
regulation of future research on the basis of
existing material, e.g., if IRB/REC
assessment, approval of patient organization/
patient representatives, or interaction will
be needed. Additionally, for the CA to be
valid, a plan for what happens if the
conditions are not fulfilled must be included,
e.g., how breaches will be handled, who will
be responsible for avoiding breaches, and how
the breaches will be compensated.
Additionally, withdrawal options must be made
explicit. Clearly other ethical issues are
relevant as well, depending on the context,
however, the points mentioned appear to be
relevant for a wide range of research types
(Budimir et al., 2011). Table 2 provides an
overview of the key issues of CA.
Table 2. Overview
of key ethical issues to take into account in
designing Since Vilhjálmur’s
suggestion of explicit written authorization
in 2005 and the elaboration of conditional
consent in 2009, crucial advances have been
made both in the field of biological material
and health data analysis. Artificial
intelligence and machine learning provide vast
opportunities for generating crucial health
information. However, they also pose
challenges for traditional informed consent
procedures due to issues of privacy and
confidentiality as information is spread and
used in previously unprecedently manners and
of understanding (of the implications) due to
lack of explainability. This relates to
downstream epistemic challenges following from
the black-box problem, bias, hallucination,
and attributability (i.e., decision
ownership). Advances in the biological
sciences have generated a wide range of
biological material beyond biobank material
that poses challenges to informed consent, for
which authorization may be helpful.
Advances in science and
technology facilitate a wide range of other
types of person-related biological entities
(PeRBE), such as cell-lines, organoids, and
xenografts (and potentially also xenobots).
Additionally, regenerative medicine,
reproductive medicine, as well as synthetic
biology including gene editing produce PeRBE
(Hofmann, 2023) and raise basic issues of
informed consent, e.g., consent from future
persons for interventions or research before
their ability to consent (e.g., before their
birth). Hence, PeRBEs extend and enhance the
challenges with consent raised by biobank
research. Figure 1 provides an overview of
various types of PeRBEs. Figure 1. Overview of
types of person-related biological entities
(PeRBE) that raise basic issues about informed
consent both for clinical practice and
research
The challenges with
informed consent are becoming ever more
topical with this expansion of biological
material beyond traditional biobank content.
In particular, the issue of addressing the
moral status and responsibilities for
biological material is enhanced when it comes
to organoids, reproductive medicine, and
synthetic biology, in particular when PeRBE
includes gametes or products or results
thereof. Moreover, openness and
transparency with respect to the uncertainty
of both risks and benefits is crucial for
authorization to various types of PeRBE
research (and clinical practices). PeRBEs also enhance the
challenges due to relationships to other
biological entities and data sources. For
example, biological entities may be
genetically modified, but still strongly
related to their source. Relationships as well
as potential future connections and related
uncertainties must be specified in
authorizations. Clearly, consent
retraction will be impossible for a wide range
of PeRBE research (as it involves future
biological entities with potential moral
status). Hence, authorizations must take
restricted authority of biological material
into account and be explicit about such
issues. The point here is not to
provide a full-fledged framework for
authorizations for PeRBEs, but only to
indicate that authorizations can be viable for
addressing ethical issues beyond health sector
databases (HSDs) and biobanks. The same
argument can be made for the introduction of
artificial intelligence and machine learning
(AI/ML). Discussion
In this
article, I have taken Vilhjálmur Árnason’s
conception of informed written authorization
as a point of departure to address ethical
challenges with informed consent for biobank
research and beyond. In particular, I have
indicated how authorizations may be fruitful
for addressing the enhanced challenges posed
by advances in biological sciences generating
a wide range of person-related biological
entities and in artificial intelligence and
machine learning. Certainly,
there are many limitations to this study. For
example, Vilhjálmur is not fully clear on the
relationship between consent and
authorization, e.g., when he states that
authorization is “an alternative way to obtain
consent” (Vilhjálmur, 2004). Accordingly, it
may be argued that there is little difference
between authorization and consent, e.g., broad
consent or dynamic (specific) consent. With
broad consent “[i]nformation about aims, risks
and potential benefits thus is provided in
rough outline only, for example by naming
general objectives of the projects, invoking
guidelines all future research projects are
obliged to follow, and by informing about
risks that are common to all these projects”
(Wiertz & Boldt, 2022). This very much
resembles authorization. Correspondingly, in
dynamic specific consent “online platforms
would allow research participants to view
information in a format of their choice,
adequate to their level of education and
interest. An option to pose further questions
to researchers could be provided. Information
should not only be provided at the onset of a
new study, but should be updated regularly to
keep participants informed” (Wiertz &
Boldt, 2022).
However, as indicated, there
are some crucial differences. Authorization
does not give the guise of being consent,
i.e., to fulfil requirements of
understanding, competency, and
voluntariness. It is more honest. Clearly,
one could alter the concept of consent as to
not having to fulfil the standard criteria.
However, this is a more challenging task
than to apply a different concept that
apparently better fits the subject matter.
Simply put, it is easier to change the map
than the landscape. However,
I think the point is that authorization is an
alternative to consent, which is closely
enough connected to cover the important
ethical issues that informed consent is
construed to address, and at the same time
provides a flexibility to handle its
shortcomings. Clearly,
authorizations may need extensive
specifications and raises the question of
whether they amount to unmanageable
bureaucracy. As with all other types of
authorizations, a certain level of specificity
is needed to give one’s approval, permission,
and to give away one’s authority and reduce
one’s agency. Hence, it may be cumbersome to
describe all the details of an authorization
and it may be challenging to understand all
aspects and details of an authorization, but
an authorization may specify what one does not
need information about. Yet
another counterargument is that authorizations
have exaggerated presumptions of agency. To
make a valid authorization, you need to be
able to understand and decide more than
ordinary people can. This is a valid
objection. However, as authorizations can
include concessions, their agency requirements
may be less than with informed consent. As
pointed out, authorization is included in
definitions of informed consent (Faden &
Beauchamp, 1986) and the content in
conditioned authorization is similar to what
is covered by other frameworks (Boniolo et
al., 2012), indicating that it addresses
crucial issues. Yet
another problem is how to manage withdrawal if
you do not have sufficient information. In
many ways, this makes withdrawal illusory.
Again, this is an important objection, which
is not unique to authorization. However, as
stated, CA may include statements of reduced
withdrawability, which by no means eliminates
the problem, but which may at least reduce it
and increase transparency and openness.
Future research: moving
from PeRBEs to AI/ML AI/ML is haunted by some
of the same challenges as PeRBEs,
e.g., in terms of lack of
understanding, due to what has been
called the black-box problem.
Therefore, applying traditional forms
of consent is difficult, and
authorization may be a relevant
alternative. While “explainable AI/ML”
has been launched as a solution, it
turns out that explainability is more
directed to AI experts than lay people
(London, 2019). Authorizations
therefore must take into account the
limited understanding, and especially
specify the division of
responsibilities resulting from this. The same goes for bias
and hallucination, which tend to
distort transparency and understanding
of the outcomes from AI/ML. A third
issue is the question of who owns the
decision, i.e., attributability
(Zeiser, 2024 Online first). This
enhances the requirements to specify
the accountability requirements of the
CA. This only indicates that
authorizations for AI/ML in PeRBE
research (and practice) is a relevant
field of research to investigate
whether authorizations can be feasible
for addressing ethical issues beyond
health sector databases (HSDs) and
biobanks.
Conclusion This article has taken
Vilhjálmur’s conception of informed
written authorization as a point of
departure to address ethical
challenges with informed consent for
biobank research. Moreover, it has
briefly investigated whether
authorizations may also be fruitful
for addressing the enhanced ethical
challenges posed by the many
person-related biological entities
emerging from vast advances in
biological sciences. While not providing a
full-fledged framework for
authorizations for research on
person-related biological entities and
health data, the article indicates why
Vilhjálmur’s insights and suggestions
deserve more attention than previously
given. Additionally, further research
may investigate the approach’s
promising potential in AI/ML.
Notes 1
In Iceland, the surname – Árnason – is
a patronymic and a description rather
than a name. Icelanders use and are
known by their given name. This
practice is followed throughout this
article and Vilhjálmur Árnason will be
referred to as Vilhjálmur when citing
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