Etikk i praksis. Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics (2023), 17(2), 23-39 |
http://dx.doi.org/10.5324/eip.v17i2.5026 |
Early View publication date:
18 December 2023 |
Justice in energy
transition scenarios: Perspectives from
Swedish energy politics
Patrik Baarda, Anders
Melinb, Gunnhildur Lily
Magnusdottirc
a University of
Oslo, Department of Philosophy, Classics,
History of art and ideas,
Patrik.baard@ifikk.uio.no
In this
article we justify why justice ought
to be considered in scenarios of
energy transitions, stipulate what
dimensions should reasonably be
considered, and investigate whether
such considerations are taken in
Swedish parliamentary debates on
energy policies. Through interviews
we investigated how Swedish
parliamentary politicians think
through justice in energy
transitions, providing a practical
perspective. We conclude that while
there is some overlap between
minimal conditions for energy
justice and the issues brought
forward by Swedish politicians,
several issues are omitted. Examples
include procedural justice and
recognizing Sámi interests. On the
other hand, principles of energy
justice omit economic issues, which
are however often brought up by
respondents. It can be argued that
justice issues, and not only the
technical and economic issues that
currently dominate the political
debate, should be considered in
energy transitions. It is therefore
unfortunate that questions about
justice are not adequately
recognized by Swedish members of
parliament, as outlined here by
interview results. Stronger
conclusions would require more
empirical work, but the article
points out several discrepancies
between the topics discussed in the
research literature on energy
policies, and the topics discussed
by elected parliamentarians having a
specific focus on energy policies.
Keywords: energy justice; energy transitions; Swedish energy policies; climate justice
Introduction
Energy system transitions are prerequisites for avoiding dangerous climate change while also maintaining the energy levels required for well-being. Given the wide-ranging social, economic and environmental impacts of energy transitions, justice becomes a relevant dimension, including issues such as ‘which segments of society are affected (and ignored), and which procedures exist for their mediation in order to reveal and reduce these injustices’ (van de Graaf & Sovacool 2020: 119). Energy transitions risk perpetuating existing injustices (Carley & Konisky 2020). Unfortunately, justice is often overshadowed by topics related to technological and economic development, despite ‘energy justice’ being a burgeoning field (van de Graaf & Sovacool 2020; Sovacool 2013; MacCauley 2018; Jenkins et al. 2016). In this article, we will first solidify reasons for why justice ought to be considered in energy transitions and then map different normative considerations that ought to be included in practical reasoning and, ultimately, decisions about energy transition policies.
Our
material is limited to Swedish members of
parliament. Sweden stands out as a country
with ambitious transition policies, having
set goals to double energy efficiency in
2030 relative to 2005 and to have no net
emissions of greenhouse gases by 2045. To
reach the goals of climate neutrality and no
net emissions of greenhouse gases, the
Swedish government points out the need for a
transition in railway and shipping
transportation and the electrification of
the vehicle fleet. Within industry, the use
of methods for carbon capture and storage
may be necessary (Regeringens skrivelse
2017/18: 238), and further expansion of wind
power is needed (Regeringens proposition
2017/18: 228).
Sweden
is a relevant case not only due to its
ambitious national objectives for energy
transitions but also because of how Swedish
politics have historically had a commitment
to social justice and welfare, ideally
giving Sweden an opportunity to become a
decarbonized green welfare state. In light
of this, it is reasonable to expect that
Swedish parliamentarians focusing on energy
policies would include justice in their
reasoning, given the extent of the impacts
that large-scale energy transitions are
likely to have.
In
this article we investigate three
separate but interrelated questions.
First, should justice be considered in
energy transitions? We will argue in
Section 2 that this question ought to be
answered affirmatively, leading to the
second question and topic of Section 3 –
how should justice be considered in
energy transitions? Finally, in Section
4 we investigate how Swedish
parliamentarians consider justice issues
in energy transitions, in view of the
dimensions discussed in covering the
second question.
Why should justice be considered in energy transitions?
Several reasons need to
be considered before concluding that
justice should be included in energy
transitions. First, energy justice is
a very small disciplinary field, and
very few political philosophers engage
with it. Though exceptions exist
(Arler 2020; Jenkins et al. 2016;
McCauley 2018; Sovacool 2013), ‘energy
justice’ as a field is virtually
non-existent compared to climate
justice, for instance, which for
decades has generated much discussion
in political philosophy, often related
to topics such as mitigation burdens
(Gardiner, Caney, Jamieson and Shue
2010; Jamieson 2014; Shue 2014).
Moreover, the notion that justice
should be considered is often asserted
or assumed, but rarely justified by
arguments. Second, should no
reasonable or justified reasons exist
for considering justice dimensions of
energy transitions, there is little
point in analysing the extent to which
Swedish parliamentarians discuss
justice. Third, establishing why
justice ought to be considered in
energy transitions helps us to define
what is meant by energy transitions.
Not all actions intended to impact the
production, distribution or
consumption of energy will necessarily
be encompassed by justice or have the
same degree of influence. A household
installing solar panels will surely
not have the same impact as a
government establishing incentives for
households to install solar panels.
Energy
policies are ‘reduced to technical issues
and matters of cost’, neglecting the fact
that they at their core ‘involve political
and moral choices about the kind of society
we want to live in’ (Van de Graaf &
Sovacool 2020: 2). The involvement of
political and moral choices would thus
assert that justice ought to be considered.
For example, there is a growing demand for
critical materials, minerals and metals, and
a significant growth in e-waste, including inter
alia ‘discarded wind turbine
components, electric vehicle batteries,
solar panels, smart metres, heat pumps’ (Sovacool
et al. 2020). An example of the growing
demand is the metal cobalt, used as a
critical input to batteries, superalloys,
plastics and dyes, magnets and adhesives.
The demand for cobalt is growing in
conjunction with the demand for electric
vehicles, and lithium ion batteries are one
of the fastest growing contributors to
global e-waste
(Sovacool et al. 2020: 3). Extracting
and processing these materials, needed to
realize energy transitions, impose great
environmental and public health risks to
local communities. The impacts of installing
wind power parks also affects communities.
The Sámi of northern Sweden, whose interests
are often infringed upon during such
installations on their land are one such
example (Kårtveit 2021). The large potential
impacts of energy transitions should
motivate us to make decisions that are
consistent with justice and that include
justice in energy scenarios. Transitions run
the risk of perpetuating existing
injustices, as well as giving rise to new
ones (Carley & Konisky 2020). However,
the local impacts from fossil fuel
operations are often substantially greater
than the impacts from clean energy
production (Carley and Konisky 2020: 570).
Despite
the above, there may still be reasons to
be hesitant about including justice as a
dimension to consider in energy
transitions. The conceptualization of
energy policies as concerning mainly
technical and economic issues is a
constant consideration, but in works such
as van de Graaf and Sovacool (2020),
justice issues are merely asserted and not
justified, and it is not self-evident why
justice dimensions ought to be
considered. After all, many people are
affected by domestic policies, even in
other countries and by the undertakings of
businesses, without this necessarily
invoking claims that justice ought to be
given greater room. Examples include the
controversies of corporate social
responsibility. For instance, the
undertakings of large trans-national
companies may have significant social and
economic impact in many states, but a
common, though criticized, view is that a
company ought only answer to shareholders
(Friedman 1970). However, a narrow view on
responsibilities is difficult to uphold in
a globalized economy when the impacts of
corporate decisions have such large-scale
policy, social, economic and environmental
impacts. Opting instead for recognizing
stakeholder views as a matter of justice
deserves consideration (for criticism of
the ‘shareholder view’ in corporate social
responsibility, see Freeman and Phillips
2002; Matten and Crane 2005). Similarly,
given the large impacts of energy
transitions, justice ought to be among the
considerations.
Another objection to incorporating justice in energy transitions is to suggest that while justice may be a part of large-scale energy transitions, few energy transitions are large-scale. After all, how are principles of justice relevant for whether a household wishes to install solar panels? Decarbonization implies ‘rapid, simultaneous transformations across several low-carbon systems and technologies’ (Van de Graaf and Sovacool 2020: 169), and some scholars have argued that ‘truly “transformative change” must be the result of alterations at every level of the system, simultaneously’ (Van de Graaf and Sovacool 2020: 169). The very definitions of ‘transitions’ often entail ‘radical shifts in the provision of services such as energy, transport, or food and sanitation’, and ‘often refer to a change in the state of a system rather than merely a change in technology or fuel source’ (Newell and Simms 2020: 2). Given the substantial decarbonization of energy systems that are required, both doing it piecemeal by small steps or decarbonizing whole sectors will require significant impacts on how energy is produced, distributed, and consumed.
An additional objection to including justice in energy transitions is that while they have large impacts, they do not concern the basic principles of justice, and the basic structure of a just society is what justice is all about. Principles of justice are limited to the basic structures of well-ordered societies (Rawls 1999[1971]). Other questions to be discussed after establishing such basic principles (Rawls 2005: 20; Gardiner 2011: 130) include issues such as ‘intergenerational justice, international justice, justice for those with disabilities’ (Gardiner 2011: 130). Energy would perhaps most aptly be included in such later topics. A comparison can be made with how Rawls discusses policy areas like education, health care and environmental policies. Such policies are no doubt central to any society, but they are not explicitly included in the basic principles of justice for a well-ordered society. Health care is required both for evening out asymmetries in natural primary goods and for reasons of maintaining self-respect, and to ‘restore people by health care so that once again they are fully cooperating members of society’ (Rawls 2005: 184), which can be dealt with at a legislative level. Education, on the other hand, is handled by fair equality of opportunity in education to grant citizens the capacity to be cooperating members of society (Rawls 2005: 184). But the exact form education takes will most likely be dealt with after the principles of justice have been established. Regarding the environment, Rawls concludes that ‘the status of the natural world and our proper relation to it is not a constitutional essential or a basic question of justice’ (Rawls 2005: 246). Yet Rawls suggests that ‘it seems reasonable to hope that if [justice as fairness] is sound as an account of justice among persons, it cannot be too far wrong when these broader relationships are taken into consideration’ (Rawls 1999[1971]: 449). However, environmental issues, and questions of whether to establish national parks and similar issues, are legislative questions.
However, Rawls’ narrow scope has been criticized (see Gardiner 2011). Health care, education, and the environment are highly important to realizing the primary goods encompassed by the basic principles of justice, and the same could be stated regarding access to energy services. If justice is a pivotal dimension of energy transitions, political philosophy offers valuable tools if energy policies are not ‘susceptible to resolution by the “hard” or “objective” disciplines of physics, mathematics, economics, and engineering’ (Van de Graaf and Sovacool 2020: 2).
Justice
as a dimension of energy transition
scenarios needs to be explicated, not
merely asserted. This is due to their
aggregated impacts on society, economy,
environment and individuals. Moreover,
given their large-scale impacts, political
philosophy can offer much-needed guidance
in explicating and determining the impacts
of energy transition scenarios. Lastly,
different interests must be recognized in
order for such transitions to be fair.
These are good reasons for including
justice in energy transitions, and they
counter the view that energy policies are
merely technological or economic decisions
but rather concern a policy area that
affects basic dimensions of well-being.
Defining justice: How should energy transitions scenarios be considered just?
Before
scrutinizing the empirical material, we
offer a brief critical survey of different
ways to recognize justice in energy
transitions. Some aspects have been hinted
at above, and here we will clarify the
conditions by which to assess the fairness
and justice of energy transitions to
establish a framework for scrutinizing the
empirical material in the next section.
There are different ways of specifying how justice ought to be considered. One way is through establishing principles. Sovacool (2013) suggests that energy justice consists of eight principles: (1) Availability; (2) Affordability; (3) Due process; (4) Information; (5) Prudence; (6) Intragenerational justice; (7) Intergenerational justice; and (8) Responsibility. The principles suggest inter alia that affected communities must be involved in deciding about projects, and there is furthermore a responsibility to protect the natural environment (Sovacool 2013: 222). Tentatively, an energy transition that fails to consider any of the eight principles without justifiable reasons could be considered unjust
While perhaps being adequate for global energy justice, these principles risk being too vast and covering too large a set of issues to be suitable as a framework for analysing parliamentarian views of a single state. For instance, ‘affordability’ includes fuel poverty, which is rare in Sweden. In a 2013 overview of EU member states, an average of 12.1 percent of households reported being unable to pay to keep their home adequately heated (Thomson & Snell 2013). The corresponding share for Sweden was slightly above one percent, although the percentage of households that reported arrears on utility bills within the last 12 months was slightly above 5 percent in Sweden compared to the EU average of 7.8 percent (Thomson & Snell 2013: 567). Consequently, concerns over fuel poverty per se might justifiably be excluded by Swedish politicians – although increasing consumer costs could be a concern.1 Similarly, the ‘resource curse’ of some countries that have high levels of poverty despite having significant natural resources prompts the need for transparency and information accountability (Sovacool 2013: 90). Such issues may be primarily indirectly relevant to nation states such as Sweden, who should arguably be interested in acting consistently with demands of international justice and thus, embracing transparency in energy consumption in this context. Risks of conflicts between the principles are more problematic, which Sovacool’s framework neglects. This neglect challenges practical implementation. Sovacool is not clear about the extent to which they are prima facie principles that can be trumped, and under what conditions overruling a principle is justified. This is unfortunate, as the conflicts between them are many. One common example could involve conflicts between intergenerational and intragenerational justice and under which conditions resources should be devoted to current generations or to future generations. This concerns the overarching question of discount rates, and what value to give future generations in current decisions (Caney 2014; Jamieson 2014). As another example, Principle 8 entails that ‘all nations have a responsibility to protect the natural environment and minimize energy-related environmental threats’ (Sovacool 2013: 219). But often conflicts emerge between economic and environmental pillars of sustainable development, making it questionable as to whether economic growth can be decoupled from environmental exploitation (Jackson 2009). It has been suggested that the principles ought be considered hierarchical (Sovacool and Dworkin 2014: 371ff). Consequently, a possible way of managing conflicts is that a principle higher up the scale would trump a principle lower down the scale. But this can only get us so far, as the potential conflicts and dilemmas suggested above are likely to persist, and it is unclear under what conditions a higher ranked principle would override others or whether it would do so under all circumstances.
Another
approach is to consider tenets or
dimensions of energy justice. Such
approaches do not rely on specifying
principles. An example of ‘core tenets’ is
found in Jenkins et al. ’s (2016) overview
of energy justice. They suggest that an
account of energy justice must ‘(a)
identify the concern – distribution, (b)
identify who it affects – recognition, and
only then (c) identify strategies for
remediation – procedure’ (Jenkins et
al. 2016:
175). Thus, distributive justice,
recognition and procedural justice are the
three core tenets of energy justice in
their accounting.
Distributive justice investigates and explicates ‘where energy injustices emerge in the world’, whereas recognition considers ‘which sections of society are ignored or misrepresented’, and procedural justice entails ‘exploring the ways in which decision-makers have sought to engage with communities’ (Jenkins et al. 2016: 175). Jenkins et al. (2016) distinguish between two dimensions of distributional justice, namely the unequal allocation of environmental benefits and ills and the uneven distribution of responsibilities (2016: 176). The second core tenet is recognition, relating to the question of who is affected. Building upon Fraser (1999), there are three main categories of misrecognition; cultural domination, non-recognition, and disrespect (McCauley 2018: 15; Jenkins et al. 2016; 177). Recognition concerns whose interests are considered in decisions and what impacts are included in energy transition plans and scenarios. Just recognition of social differences is also central for procedural justice (Jenkins et al. 2016). Recognition-based justice entails that the impacts on ethnic minorities or indigenous people be considered, being groups that are often ignored or misrepresented (Jenkins et al. 2016: 175). In Sweden, this includes the aboriginal Sámi, where wind and hydropower affect their interests and ways of life in substantial ways (Kårtveit 2021).
Arler has formulated an example of dimensions of energy justice (2001; 2020). Arler suggests three dimensions of ethical consideration in energy, as shown in Figure 1 (from Arler 2020: 8).
At the core of sustainable development lies the temporal dimension. The dual objectives of energy transitions – to avoid contributing to dangerous climate change while also maintaining energy availability at sufficient levels for well-being and economic growth – both concern future generations, first due to the necessity of avoiding dangerous climate change, and second to secure long-term availability of green and sustainable energy systems. The intergenerational issue also involves other energy sources, such as nuclear power and storage of spent nuclear energy. This is relevant in the case of Sweden, where nuclear energy in 2020 provided approximately 27 percent of energy needs (IEA n.d.).
Questions regarding the spatial dimension of energy policies include issues such as dividing burdens to enable energy transitions. While the differences in burdens are encapsulated in the UNFCCC ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, such a principle is often specified through other principles, such as ‘ability to pay principle’, ‘beneficiary pay principle’ and ‘polluter pay principle’ (Caney 2020; Caney 2010). Moreover, the spatial and cultural dimension includes the width of the sphere of moral relevance. The issue of whether there are special obligations due to community belonging, or whether fully global principles are applicable to all, are complex issues in political philosophy (Caney 2005; Kymlicka 2001). Again, an additional aspect is the relevance of groups, such as the Sámi people in Finland, Norway and Sweden, whose interests are often neglected when wind power infringes on their land (Kårtveit 2021).
Along the third axis we find issues often discussed in environmental ethics, regarding the potential ethical and political weight of other animals, species and ecosystems. Sovacool (2013) also includes environmental concern in his eight principles, and others discuss interspecies justice as a dimension of energy justice (McCauley 2018; Frigo 2018), but it is often unclear what substantiates such principles, and what their status is relative other principles, which may lead to moral conflicts. Discussions of interspecies justice have arisen regarding potential environmental impacts during siting of hydropower and wind power, and environmental management can vary due to differing values or different perceptions regarding the normative status of conservation practices.
Arler’s framework has several benefits. First, it is not based on formulating rigid principles, but neither is it an overly permissive accounting. Instead, it is what Arler calls ‘midway ethics’ (Arler 2020: 6). That is, the dimensions adhere to the challenge of finding ‘a conception that is both theoretically justifiable and empirically recognizable’, but also that is neither ‘so demanding that no one will ever be able to comply with its demands nor […] so unchallenging that just about anything goes anywhere at any time’ (Arler 2020: 6).
Above
we have intended to show different
conceptions of energy justice and examples
of what ought to be considered for energy
transitions to be deemed just. These
provide a ‘mapping’ of the ethical
concerns in energy justice that are
relevant for considering justice in energy
transitions and will be used to discuss
the empirical data in the next section.
Not all of the issues are fully relevant,
and the mapping is not intended as a score
card by which to assess how Swedish energy
transition politics hold up relative to
the demands of justice, but rather as a
way of navigating the field of energy
justice and making sense of the empirical
data. Nor are all relevant justice topics
included. For instance, it is noteworthy
that gender is missing, as there are
gender differences between contributions
to climate change and energy consumption,
and the impact of climate change and
energy transitions (Bell, Daggett and
Labuskito 2020; Gaard 2017).
The
‘maps’, most fully Arler’s account,
provide issues that ought to be taken
into consideration to meet the demands
of justice. Moreover, Arler’s account,
by being ‘midway ethics’ that can be
both theoretically justified as well as
empirically recognizable (2020: 6),
makes it suitable for assessing
empirical material. It is neither
theoretically detached from practical
concerns, nor is it normatively empty
and lacking critical accounts of
practical politics.
Justice in practice: Which
dimensions of justice are considered by
Swedish politicians?
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