Etikk i praksis. Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics (2020),
14
(2), 53-70 |
http://dx.doi.org/10.5324/eip.v14i2.3490 |
Territorial Presence as a Ground for Claims: Some Reflections
Linda Bosniak
"Territorial
Presence as a Ground for Claims: Some Reflections"
returns to political theory to assess the moral and
legal position of those individuals who reside
within the territory of liberal democratic states,
but whose presence is unauthorized by the state. The
author poses the question as to what their physical
presence means and does from a political
perspective. The paper is part of a broader
political phenomenology of territoriality in liberal
national thought, one that emphasizes the idea that
migrants’ physical presence within the state’s
territory lies at the analytical heart of the
conversation about irregular immigrants. What is
paradoxical about territorial presence of
unauthorized migrants is that such presence is
simultaneously (1) the source of the offence that
states invoke as a justification for rendering them
‘illegal’; (2) the basis for basic fair treatment
protections the migrants may claim from the state
while present; and (3) the ground for claims they
make (or that are made on their behalf) to remain
present – i.e., to stay in the territory. The
phenomenology of territorial presence is thus
fertile ground for analyzing arbitrary and
repressive law-making in migration, as well as for
theorizing "immigrant justice" as resistance to such
law-making. In the course of this discussion, the
author analyzes the widely invoked idea of
“sanctuary” as a conceptual frame for such
resistance. She concludes that “sanctuary” claims,
as propounded by both liberal humanitarians and
immigrant justice advocates, seek to ground rights
and recognition in what is claimed to be the
overriding ethical significance of immigrants’
territorial presence now – of their already-hereness. The author shows how
deployments of "sanctuary" strategies offer a
powerful logic of safe harbor for those
already-here, one that is ever more necessary in a
period of increasingly repressive internalized
borders. Nevertheless, she also concludes,
sanctuary-as-strategy falls theoretically short of
taking on the constitutive border exclusionism that
gives rise to the predicament of irregularity in the
first instance. A more robust critical stance would
have to insist that borders not just be mitigated,
but radically deconstructed and even abolished. It
is at precisely this abolitionist juncture, however,
that critical theory faces the constraints of
feasibility which action-oriented policy reformers
demand. The author regards grappling with the
utility/utopia dilemma to be a vital task
confronting critical legal and political theorists
engaged in rethinking arbitrary and repressive
law-making, especially in view of the rampant new inequalities produced by a global
political order grounded in sovereign borders. Keywords: borders, territorial presence, irregular
status, United States, resistance My subject today is the
complex posture of persons who are located
inside the territory of self-avowed
liberal democratic states when their
presence in the territory has been deemed
by that state to be unauthorized. What
does the fact of their physical presence
mean and do politically? The paper is part
of a broader political phenomenology of
territoriality in liberal national
thought.
As is now well-known,
assaults on the liberal democratic order
in the United States – on
constitutionalism, on civility, on truth –
have ranged almost indiscriminately across
domains since the 2016 election. Even so,
immigration stands out. From early in the
campaign, it was Trump’s showcase issue,
and it remains one of the foremost arenas
in which the new America-First, nativist
shock politics are being enacted. A number
of different initiatives have been
pursued.
And yet, to return to the argument I began making earlier, the current illiberalizing moment is beginning to upend this uneasy settlement. In the United States specifically, the Trump administration has launched a belligerent campaign of interior border enforcement – and is carrying it out to a degree and in ways that threaten to undo constraints on state power that individual rights commitments have until now sometimes provided. Trump’s
executive order titled Border Security
and Immigration Enforcement Improvements,
issued five days after his inauguration,
begins with this Declaration of Purpose: Interior
enforcement of our Nation's immigration laws
is critically important to the national
security and public safety of the United
States. Many aliens who illegally enter the
United States and those who overstay or
otherwise violate the terms of their visas
present a significant threat to national
security and public safety (Border Security
and Immigration Enforcement Improvements).
Widening of the Enforcement Net First, the new administration
formally eliminated tiered and prioritized
protective discretion in immigration
enforcement and is now mandating enforcement
against any and all suspected immigration
law violators. This departs from the policy
of the Obama Administration which had
expressly deprioritized immigration
enforcement against certain irregular
immigrants with no criminal record, and had
affirmatively declined to enforce
immigration law against certain categories
of irregularly present noncitizens – sick
people, pregnant women, children, military
veterans and people pursuing civil rights
claims, among others. As noted above,
Obama’s policy was to instead focus the
government’s enforcement arsenal on people
characterized as "criminal aliens". This
focus on criminality was itself problematic
– especially given the ever-broadening
legislative definition of crimes triggering
deportation. Yet the prior policy did leave
millions of undocumented persons that the
government had characterized as "otherwise
law-abiding," more or less alone. Moreover,
that administration undertook affirmative
policies to protect, ex ante and en masse,
some classes of irregular migrants – such as
through the DACA program.
Heightened
criminalization
of immigration
violations
Together with the end of
discretionary forbearance, we must note that
immigration violations have been
increasingly redefined as criminal
violations in the U.S. (and elsewhere) over
the past few years.9 Previously, basic immigration
offenses (e.g., "entry without inspection";
"reentry after removal") had mostly been
treated as civil offenses (though statutory
law contained resources for criminalized
enforcement). Earlier administrations had
only minimally begun to criminalize the
field as a matter of enforcement. But
Trump’s Attorney General Jeff Sessions has
specifically instructed federal prosecutors
to "increase [their] efforts…[in] making
immigration offenses higher priorities" for
criminal enforcement (Attorney General
2017). As stated by Sessions: "Under the
President’s leadership and through his
Executive Orders, we will secure this border
and bring the full weight of both the
immigration courts and federal criminal
enforcement to combat this attack on our
national security and sovereignty."10
Expansions of
the Domains of
Immigration
Enforcement
Another of the Trump
administration’s significant innovations is
the radical expansion of the domains and loci
of immigration enforcement. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) – the internal
immigration enforcement arm of the Department
of Homeland Security – has launched a
concerted campaign of investigations and
arrests in venues that, under previous
administrations, had been treated as
"sensitive locations" – state-maintained
domains that, I have argued, functioned as
"sanctuaries" of sorts – and were thereby
off-limits as a matter of discretion. Yet in
the new moment, ICE agents have all-but
abandoned the policy, and arenas once
relatively insulated are now fair game.11 Significant enforcement efforts
have thus been launched in local courthouses,
where individuals are engaged in proceedings
over child custody, domestic violence and
landlord/tenant disputes.12 ICE officers have also arrested
people in hospitals and clinics, in school
drop-off zones, in public libraries and
neighborhood centers, in food pantries and
grocery stores, as well as in homes and
workplaces.
Finally, and significantly, the
U.S. federal government has sought to expand
the class of parties who enforce. States and
localities are being enlisted, by both
invitation and coercion, to partner with the
federal government in enforcing immigration
law.13 Some states and localities are
eager to team up. Others are refusing to
assist or even cooperate with the new
enforcement surge, at least to a point,
leading to various unfolding struggles often
dubbed "sanctuary cities" policies. They
justify their refusal in the name of public
safety, arguing that when undocumented
immigrants fear encounters with the police
as crime victims or witnesses, communities
suffer. The Trump administration, in turn,
is seeking to force compliance by
threatening withdrawal of federal funding.
Whether such coercion is constitutionally
permissible is being litigated in the courts
(e.g., Gerstein 2018).
These recent developments have
taken us from what was already a grim
situation for irregular immigrants in the
United States to a real siege condition.
Still, this enforcement deluge is not going
unchallenged. Resistors of various stripes
seek to block and oppose many of these
initiatives in an effort to shield and protect
immigrants and hold the government to account.
Notes
1 Note also that international law
imposes responsibilities on all sovereign
states, liberal or otherwise, for treatment of
territorially present noncitizens (i.e.,
citizens of other states). This is not merely
a function of individual human rights
obligations arising post WW II but, more
longstandingly, of a legal regime grounded in
states’ responsibilities to other states –
including the "host" state’s responsibility to
the state of which the territorially present
noncitizen is a national. See generally Spiro (2011). 2
Occasionally, claims are made on behalf of
those already deported and thus no longer
present – on grounds that their prior presence
was wrongfully taken from them via wrongful
deportation. These people seek restoration of
that presence. See Bosniak (2016). 3 This is
a structure which Trump long claimed Mexico
would pay for – and now the government claims
it will be financed by a tax on remittances by
Mexican immigrants to their country. 4 Addition of Venezuela and North
Korea to the list of precluded states was
invoked to bolster administration’s argument
that it is not specifically anti-Muslim animus
motivating the policy. 5 Concept of "nativism" itself is
both contested and internally complex. See
Bosniak (1997). 6 Meanwhile, the government has
been engaged in a massive hiring campaign for
ICE employees: the only area of federal
government that is not being cut back.
Recruiting is happening all over, including on
college campuses. 7 And even before their permits
expire, scores of DACA holders have been
targeted for deportation in the wake of minor
traffic violations and status technicalities. 8
Studies/litigation making point. 9 And here, I must note that the
statutory infrastructure permits this: the
underlying statute delegating enforcement
power to the executive branch offers the new
administration plenty of room to proceed. That
is: Much of what Trump is doing is entirely
consistent with the statute. 10 Moreover, per AG Sessions: "For
those that continue to seek improper and
illegal entry into this country, be
forewarned: This is a new era. This is the
Trump era. The lawlessness, the abdication of
the duty to enforce our immigration laws and
the catch and release practices of old are
over." (Attorney
General 2017). 11 The ICE website states that it
maintains a "sensitive locations" policy,
though in narrowed form. In practice, the
policy is often breached. Thus far, however,
immigration enforcement actions have not been
carried out in places of religious worship. 12 E.g.,
"ICE Formalizes Plans For Courthouse Arrests"
http://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-ice-plans-courthouse-arrests-20180131-story.html 13
Sec. 287(g); mandates and
"sanctuary cities"; tip lines. 14 Homeland Security Investigations
Tip Line: 866-DHS-2-ICE https://www.ice.
gov/tipline 15 Some
universities embrace protective stances but
have been unwilling to deploy the sanctuary
term, either because they regard it as
politically inflammatory or because they say
it misleadingly suggests provision of greater
protection to the undocumented than actually
on offer. For general discussion of
politicization of the sanctuary term, see e.g., Farman (2017). 16
Referring to the DREAM Act, a legislative
initiative that would have regularized
hundreds of thousands of undocumented youth.
Congress came close to passing that
legislation more than once, and the Obama
administration supported it, but it ultimately
failed. It was in response to that failure
that Obama implemented DACA. 17 Bosniak, "Unapologetic" (2016).
(Institute For Advanced Study) (unpublished
paper). 18 "Not
One More" is a slogan the immigrant justice
movement has been pressing for several years. 19 For further development of this
argument, see Bosniak (2013). 20 As one commentator put it,
"black people need sanctuary cities too." (Bonsu 2017). 21 New School for Social Research
Initiative on Extended Sanctuary 2017-2018
(Ticktin, Farman Delano, McNevin). 22 "Liberalism is a world of walls,
and each one creates a new liberty.”
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