Etikk i praksis. Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics (2019),
13(1), 81-88 |
http://dx.doi.org/10.5324/eip.v13i1.2876 |
Moderate Conventionalism and Cultural Appropriation
Juha Räikkä* & Mikko M. Puumala** *University of Turku, Åbo, Finland, jraikka@utu.fi **University of Turku, Åbo, Finland, mikko.puumala@utu.fi
Cultural appropriation, also
called cultural borrowing, has been the topic
of much discussion in recent years. Roughly
speaking, cultural appropriation happens when
someone outside of a cultural or ethnic group
takes or uses some object that is
characteristic or in some way important to the
group without the group’s permission.
Individuals who find cultural appropriation
(or borrowing) unproblematic have often argued
that if we express moral criticism of the use
of traditional Sami outfits by non-Sami, then
we are logically committed to criticize all
kinds of habits that are clearly acceptable
–such as using jeans, eating pizza or drinking
tea. However, we will argue that in many cases
that objection is problematic. We point out
that if one social habit or practice is
prohibited (or supported) by existing social
conventions but another is not, then there is
a convention difference between the cases. The
convention difference is in turn a morally
relevant difference, or so we aim to show. We
refer to “moderate conventionalism,” according
to which existing social conventions are
morally relevant facts that should be taken
into account when choosing how to act,
whatever the content of the conventions
happens to be. The claim is analogous with the traditional view that
laws have some moral relevance and binding
force independent of their content. Keywords:
cultural
appropriation, conventionalism, moderate
conventionalism, convention difference
Cultural appropriation, also called
cultural borrowing, has been the topic of much
discussion in recent years. Roughly speaking,
cultural appropriation happens when someone
outside a cultural or an ethnic group takes or
uses some object that is characteristic or in
some way important to the group without the
group’s permission. A deeper understanding of
cultural appropriation would require an
historical description of the phenomenon, but
here we can shed some light on the issue by
means of concrete examples. A famous example of
a debate that has centered around the notion of
cultural appropriation concerns the question of
whether it is morally appropriate for white men
to play the blues (see Rudinow 1994; Young
1994). Another example of such a debate is a
recent discussion about outsiders’ alleged right
to wear traditional clothing of indigenous
groups (see Lynskey 2014). Is it morally
acceptable to wear headgear of a Native American
indigenous group to a costume party? In the
former discussion the focus has been on the
right to produce certain goods, but in the
latter the focus has shifted to the issue of
whether outsiders have a moral right to use the
goods of some cultural groups at all. The
examples are different, and they correctly
suggest that cultural appropriation can come in
many forms. Notice that the debate on immaterial
property rights concerns many issues that are
related to the cultural borrowing. Music,
cuisine, words, and medicine are typical
examples (for a discussion, see Ziff & Rao
1997; Young & Brunk 2009).
In this paper our aim is not to evaluate standard arguments against cultural appropriation, or the responses to those arguments. Instead, we consider what the moral doctrine called conventionalism says about cultural appropriation. According to conventionalism, an action is morally right if and only if it conforms to the conventions of society. In its pure form, conventionalism is in many ways a problematic doctrine, but we strive to show that moderate conventionalism does not face the problems of pure conventionalism, and that moderate conventionalism is a rather plausible view. According to moderate conventionalism, existing social conventions – understood as norms of “positive morality” that tell us what is acceptable and what is not – are morally relevant facts that should be taken into account when choosing how to act, whatever the content of the conventions happens to be. The claim is analogous with the traditional view that laws have some moral relevance and binding force independent of their content. Moderate conventionalism does not have strong implications for the debate concerning cultural appropriation, but it does have some. Our task here is to specify what those implications are. In Defense of Moderate Convetionalism Let us start
with pure, rather than
moderate, conventionalism.
According to one version
of (pure) conventionalism,
an action is morally right
if and only if it conforms
to the conventions of
society. To the extent
that conventionalism has
any intuitive
plausibility, it derives
from the fact that
cultures and countries
have somewhat different
traditions and cultural
habits, and in many cases
it makes sense to follow
the local standards rather
than norms that are alien
to most people involved.
Moderate conventionalism refers to morality, instead of merely “positive morality” (understood as existing moral norms) of a society. Moderate conventionalists hold that conforming to social conventions is a prima facie right for the reasons described above. Of course, if the social conventions are unfair or otherwise unacceptable, then it is permissible and even obligatory to criticize them. Societal conventions that rely on apartheid policies have moral relevance, since they are conventions adopted by some people, but obviously there are dozens of reasons not to follow those conventions, despite their prima facie moral force. Needless to say, although there are many reasons why conventions might have prima facie importance, they can always be overridden. Moderate Conventionalism and Cultural Appropriation Moderate conventionalism has some
interesting implications for the debate on
cultural appropriation. Consider the Jeans
Argument: P1. If outsiders’ use of
traditional Sami outfits in funny TV shows is
morally problematic, then it is also morally
problematic to use jeans (in funny TV shows), as
they form a part of the group identity of the
American working class. P2. But obviously the use of jeans
is not morally problematic in funny TV shows. C. Therefore, outsiders’ use of
traditional Sami outfits is not
morally problematic either. The structure of the Jeans Argument
is rather common in debates concerning different
forms of cultural appropriation (or cultural
borrowing), and the most common reply to the
arguments that share this structure is to reject
its first premise. For instance, in the case of
the Jeans Argument, one can argue that using
Sami outfits is morally problematic, since Sami
people are a potentially vulnerable indigenous
group, whereas the members of the American
working class are relatively rich, and its group
identity may be non-existent (although Bruce
Springsteen would probably disagree). Moderate
conventionalism provides a novel reason to
reject the first premise of the arguments that
share the structure of the Jeans Argument. In
some cases, a morally relevant difference exists
between the cases that are presented in the
argument. This is the difference that only one
of the practices is supported by the existing
social conventions. Possibly, one of the
differences between the use of the traditional
Sami outfit in a TV show and the use of jeans in
a TV show is that social conventions restrict
the use of the Sami outfit, whereas they do not
restrict the use of jeans. Social conventions
may allow the use of jeans. This is a morally
relevant difference, given that moderate
conventionalism holds. (No doubt, it is often
difficult to name the conventions, especially if
some people deny their legitimacy. Note also
that we may encounter a situation in which it is
completely appropriate to use Sami outfits and
where there is nothing insulting or
unconventional in such behavior.)
Objections and Replies Before concluding, we would like
to discuss some possible objections to the
points we have made.
We would like to thank Eerik
Lagerspetz, Nadim Khoury, Kasper
Lippert-Rasmussen, Annamari Vitikainen,
Anna-Karin Andersson, Susanne Uusitalo, Polaris
Koi, Laura Puumala, Helena Siipi, Jari
Kärkkäinen, Markku Oksanen, Jukka Varelius,
Elisa Aaltola and the anonymous referees of Etikk i
praksis for their helpful comments on
earlier versions of the paper. Mikko
Puumala would like to thank Nessling Foundation
for financial support. References
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