Etikk i praksis. Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics (2017), 11(2), 79–94
http://dx.doi.org/10.5324/eip.v11i2.1959
The concept of a European public sphere within European public discourse
Sanja Ivic
Institute for European Studies, Belgrade, Serbia sanja_ivic1@yahoo.com
This inquiry analyses the concept of a ‘European
public sphere’ within the European public discourse. In particular, it explores
the European Communication Strategy for creating an active European citizenship
and European public sphere. The European Commission’s Plan D for Democracy,
Dialogue and Debate failed, because it employed homogeneous and static concepts
of public sphere and European values. In this way it reduced deliberation to a
mere debate. The European Year of Citizens was not sufficiently successful for
the same reason. It involved citizens who debated about EU rights, but it did
not produce deliberation. The purpose of this inquiry is to show the
dialectical relation between the ideas of European values, European identity
and European public sphere.This
paper emphasizes the performative nature of a European public sphere, European
identity and European values. These concepts may be perceived as grand
narratives, which aim to generate universal truths.
This inquiry analyses the
concept of a ‘European public sphere’ within the European public discourse. In
particular, it explores the European Communication Strategy for creating an
active European citizenship and European public sphere.In the last two decades, the question
of the European public sphere was often understood within the context of
discussions of the European ‘democratic deficit’. A deeper look at how European
political institutions create and affect the European public sphere has not yet
been sufficiently explored. This paper broadens this discussion and analyses
various deliberative democratic attempts to construct the European public
sphere. In particular, the European Commission’s Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate (Plan D) and the European Commission’s proposal for the “European
Year of Citizens” will be analysed.
This article advocates deliberation and deliberative
democracy as effective tools to create a more inclusive European citizenship
and European public sphere. Deliberative democracy also solves the problem of
the Union’s democratic legitimacy. The European Commission made several
deliberative democratic attempts to create an active European citizenship and
European public sphere. Former European Commission President José Manuel
Barroso states: ‘I would like to see the development of a European public
space, where European issues are discussed and debated from a European
standpoint. We cannot continue trying to solve European problems just with
national solutions’ (Barroso 2012).
Both the European Commission’s Plan D for Democracy,Dialogue
and Debate and the European Year of Citizens advocate deliberative
democracy as a necessary part of active citizenship. However, these attempts
were not successful since they led to mere debate, not deliberation. Another
problem to be taken into account in this paper is the static and homogeneous
understanding of the public sphere within the European legal documents.
The purpose of this inquiry is to show the dialectical
relationship between ideas of European values, European identity and the
European public sphere. Concepts of ‘European values’, ‘European identity’ and
the ‘European public sphere’ should not be understood as homogeneous and
static. They should be perceived as dynamic and polymorphous, because they are
constantly reinterpreted and adjusted. This paper aims to show that successful
deliberation at the European level requires that ‘European values’ and the
‘European public sphere’ be understood as heterogeneous, contingent and shifting
concepts.
The method employed in this paper is
multidisciplinary. It is based on a discursive approach, since discourse is
central to understanding both European democracy and the European public
sphere. The method of political discourse analysis is fragmented and
heterogeneous due to the multidisciplinary nature of the field, which includes
various approaches. Political discourse analysis involves various conceptual
and methodological approaches.
This inquiry also relies on Derrida’s deconstructive approach,
which aims at rethinking traditional concepts, such as ‘public sphere’,
‘identity’, ‘European values’, and ‘democracy’.Postmodern and
‘poststructuralist approaches
emphasize the performative and enacting quality of discourses, while focusing
on power relations inherent in discursive practices. Discourse is often
regarded as the key entry point to access the social world (…)
Poststructuralism establishes a relationship of co-constitutionalism between
the social world and the subject, the social structure and the agents’ (Carta
& Wodak 2015: 6).
However, poststructuralist and postmodern
approaches includevarious points
of views represented by different authors. Derrida’s deconstructive approach
questions and redefines some of the main concepts of European legal and
political discourse. The main concepts in European law and politics are
constructed rather than fixed. That means that they can constantly be reread
and transformed. Applying Derrida’s deconstructive approach to the European legal
and political discourse includes two tasks. The first one is to deconstruct the
definitions and standards that represent the foundation of dominant European
discourse. This task questions the ‘objectivity’ and ‘rationality’ of the main
concepts employed in legal and political discourse. The second task is to
transform the main definitions and standards – that is, to reconstruct them. It
rebuilds the basic concepts of European legal and political discourse in such a
way that they do not reinforce or support dominance produced by various binary
oppositions.
Derrida (1992) aims to deconstruct the idea of a
Europe based on the ideals of the Enlightenment and contemplates a
‘post-Enlightenment’ Europe that is capable of ‘self-critique’ and constant
reinterpretation of its values and goals. This ‘post-Enlightenment’ Europe
overcomes Eurocentrism; within this idea of Europe, Derrida deconstructs the
notions of European values and identity as defined by static definitions
stemming from the idea of ‘European heritage’. Instead, he suggests that these
values and identity be perceived as contingent and polyphonic – as tasks.
European identity and values are dynamic and fluid categories that cannot be
adequately tackled by traditional methods of legal and political studies, which
do not take into account the flexible and shifting nature of identities, values
and political discourses. For this reason, Derrida’s perspective offers an
adequate approach to the question of European democracy and European identity
and values, since it is based on the constant reinterpretation of concepts and
overcomes and rethinks binary oppositions, such as we/they, self/other,
European/non-European, or citizen/refugee.
Derrida’s deconstructive approach, when applied to
questions of contemporary Europe, aims to overcome the tension between Europe
and its ‘other’. This is where, for Derrida, a link between (European) heritage
and its promise lies. ‘Derrida reads the discourses of Europe, highlights their
aporetic tension and temporal disjunction, demonstrating the points of
instability and contradictions without achieving reconciliation, but making
possible the re-affirmation of Europe’ (Caraus 2014).
According to Derrida (1974), one cannot make a sharp
distinction between ‘self’ and ‘other’, as ‘self’ always includes the phantom
of the ‘other’ – their relationship is dialectical. Political
self-understanding in the EU is created by public discourse (Medrano 2009:
81-82). The discursive and deconstructive approach is an effective way to tackle
the struggles for recognition of various social groups. These issues address
the question of whether equality in the practices and institutions of the
European Union is compatible with the preservation of various identities,
values and interests. Struggles for recognition can be effective only if
essentialist and quasi-essentialist conceptions of identity are reformulated
towards contingent notions of identity. Identities are open texts and they
include plurality of interpretive horizons in which we can understand both
ourselves and the ‘other’. The sharp distinction between ‘self’ and ‘other’ has
to be avoided in political and legal discourse, since these categories are
interrelated. Reasoning based on the sharp distinction between the ‘self’ and
‘other’ is imperialistic.
The postmodern condition implies pluralism and
ambivalence and requires rethinking modernist practice. Derrida reconstructs
the concepts of citizenship, identity, values and the notion of public sphere,
arguing that these concepts cannot rest on the political heritage of the
Enlightenment, which denies particularity and difference. The public sphere
should not be perceived as a unitary concept, and it should be considered as
heterogeneous.
Consequently,
it is even rather insolent to use the term ‘public’ in relation to politics,
since the sphere of common deliberation has now been enlarged to include a wide
range of groups and individuals that were previously simply ignored.
Fragmentation and eclecticism have turned the political category of
state-centered citizenship into a chaotic hotchpotch of values and accounts of
civic life. This may not have made the notion of citizenship trivial, but it is
certainly making it more problematic (Van Ham 2001: 163).
The European Commission’s Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate
The concept of a ‘European
public sphere’ should be perceived as heterogeneous. Thus the Habermasian idea
of ‘public sphere’ presented in his Structural
Transformations of the Public Sphere (1989) is not adequate for understanding
the European public sphere, since it is homogeneous. It is designed for
research in the framework of the nation-state. Therefore, it cannot be applied
to a multilayered and supranational political community such as the European
Union (EU). Habermas does not acknowledge the multiplicity of (conflicting or
overlapping) public spheres (Kellner, 2000). Moreover, the rise of the Internet
creates new public spaces and broadens the horizon of dialogue and debate. In
this way, new public spheres are produced. Since the beginning of the 1990s, research on the
European public sphere has been on the rise. However, the question of a
European public sphere is mostly discussed in the context of the European
‘democratic deficit’.1The
existence of the democratic deficit in the Union was officially recognized by
the European Commission in 2005. A period of reflection was undertaken by the
European Commission in order to overcome the crisis in the EU following a
negative referendum in the Netherlands and France in 2005. Since 2005 the
European Commission has organized a number of initiatives and projects2
in order to generate transnational deliberation by European citizens.3The European Commission has mostly focused on the question of inclusion of
civil societies and organized groups of citizens.
The Commission was also seeking to redefine the
concepts of European values, citizenship, European public space, democracy,
European identity, and so forth. Former European Commission Vice-President
Margot Wallström presented Plan D for
Democracy, Dialogue and Debate in 2005. This plan was based on the idea on
engaging Member States with citizens in a debate on Europe and its future. It
strove to encourage an active citizenship and European public sphere. This plan
was a reaction to the rejection of the EuropeanConstitution and aspired to restore
public confidence in the European project.
The main purpose of Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate was to help Member States
organize national debates on the future of Europe. Plan D aimed at enabling a broad debate in Member States ‘involving
citizens, civil society, social partners, national parliaments and political
parties’ (European Commission 2005). Former Commission Vice-President Margot
Wallström believed that these discussions would lead to the creation of a
European public sphere.
In recent studies, it is often argued that
deliberative democracy can solve the problem of democratic deficit in the EU.
Deliberative democracy promotes diversity and pluralism. It is a path towards
active and more inclusive citizenship, which is based on participation,
inclusion and equal moral worth (Lister 2007). Applied to the European Union,
the starting point for deliberative democracy ‘could be to look at the notion
of the public sphere, the role of parliamentary discourse, and negotiations in
the committee system’ (Eriksen 1999).
Within the framework of Plan D, thirteen initiatives were presented which endeavoured to
stimulate national debates. This plan proposes to include European citizens in
the decision-making process in the EU. It emphasizes the significance of the
public sphere, civil society and well-informed citizens (European Commission,
2005). Proponents argue that this plan represents a shift from the EU as a
project of the elite to the EU as a European citizens’ project, with the result
that the European Commission did not try to rescue the Constitution for Europe. The Commission created Plan D to promote active citizenship.
The ActionPlanto improve communicating Europe and the WhitePaper on communication strategy complemented Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate. These documents had a
role to develop and strengthen a European public sphere, ‘where citizens are
given the information and the tools to actively participate in the
decision-making process and gain ownership of the European project’ (European
Commission 2005).
Plan D was introduced as a ‘listening exercise’, to enable
the European Union to take into account the concerns of its citizens. Plan D for Democracy Dialogue and Debate states:
There is
no standard model for the organisation of debates in the Member States. In
some, there are permanent structures, forums or platforms which seek to hold
regular debates on European issues. In others, there is less of an organised
system for dialogue and debate. Models such as the National Forum in Ireland or
the Platform for Europe in Spain may offer inspiration to Member States
(European Commission 2005).
These dialogues are mostly organized and promoted by
national, regional and local parliaments.
According to
the main characteristics of Plan D for
Democracy, Dialogue and Debate, it seems that it represents a path towards
deliberative democracy in the EU. The Commission stated that this plan is based
on three principles: ‘inclusion (all citizens should have equal access to
information on the EU); diversity (all actors should have a voice) and
participation (all voices should be heard)’ (EuropeanCommission 2005). These three principles represent basic traits of
deliberative democracy. A number of initiatives represented within the
framework of Plan D point to its
deliberative character.
However, Plan D did not fulfil its basic purpose.
European citizens are still excluded from the decision-making process in the EU.
The Treaty of Lisbon was ratified
without the open and public debate proposed by Plan D. Former European Commission Vice-President Margot Wallström
emphasized that the core idea of Plan D was
to transform the EU in accordance with the expectations and concerns of its
citizens. Excluding European citizens from the creation of the draft Treaty of Lisbon was contradictory to
the conception of citizens as actors of political changes. Consequently, Plan D merely reinforced debate rather
than producing deliberation. Debate cannot be equated with deliberation. Debate
and dialogue do not always lead to deliberation, which is a broader term.
Definitions of deliberation differ, but they all emphasize its power to
transform preferences that an agent previously held. On the other hand, the
term ‘debate’ can be applied to an argumentative exchange governed by rules.
The debate does not necessarily lead to transformation of preferences. As a
result, from the normative point of view, Plan
D did not lead to deliberation.
Deliberation is based on the idea that what is
common has to be decided in public and not prior to it (Cohen 1991: 29). The
result of different processes of consultation and open dialogue proposed by Plan D is nothing more than an open
letter that contains a list of 27 recommendations. This letter was presented to
the European leaders in December of 2007.4It did not make a substantive change to European citizenship and the
decision-making process in the EU, as emphasized in Plan D (European Commission 2007).
Fishkin argues that
the EU lacks a deliberative structure: ‘There is yet no deliberative
infrastructure for the EU or, at best, it is tentative, frail and sub-optional’
(Boucher, 2009). Plan D states that
the primary responsibility for responding to the call for open dialogue about
common European issues rests with Member States. According to Bruell, this
point of view is utopian: ‘Why should national governments be interested in
promoting balanced arguments and quasi-objective information on EU policies, if
they are so successful in using them in their blame-games? This request
entirely ignores political strategies and struggle upon power positions’
(Bruell 2007). Another problem is represented by the concept of ‘public sphere’
as employed within the framework of Plan
D. Plan D states that every
public sphere has its unique local, regional and national traits.5 However, ‘actors within the public sphere are not restricted to territorial
division. This means that the public sphere is not a materialized arena
restricted to the national, regional and local level’ (Bruell 2007). This
perspective is contradictory to the idea of open dialogue that transcends
borders and includes all European citizens as free and equal. The public
spheres cannot be perceived as monolithic bodies, and different spheres and
struggles (such as ethnic, class, religious and so forth) have to be recognized
within the framework of different public spheres (Bruell 2007). Public spheres
are heterogeneous and polyphonic categories.
The European Commission establishes a very limited
concept of the public sphere, which is perceived ‘as an information-providing
instrument’ (Bruell 2007). Plan D
does not provide the opportunity to realize heterogeneous and contradictory
projects, which is the basic characteristic of a democratic public sphere.
Consequently, the public sphere can be ‘misused as a propagandistic organ’
(Bruell 2007).
Discursive production of ‘European public sphere’, ‘European identity’ and ‘European values’
The
idea of the European public sphere is often connected to the question of
European identity (Calhoun2002;
Bruell 2007; Risse & Grabowsky 2008; Bee 2008). It is often argued that the
lack of a strong European identity means the absence of a European public
sphere (Risse & Grabowsky 2008).
The emergence of a
European public sphere depends upon constructing a common identity and sense of
belonging. It entails dialogue over issues that concern ‘Europeans’. On the
other hand, ‘actively engaging in a discourse on issues of common concerns
actually leads to a collective identification process and creates a community
of communication rather than presupposing it’ (Risse & Grabowsky 2008: 7).
In this way, concepts of a European public sphere and a common European identity
are interconnected.
A European public
sphere, European values and European identity are constructed through political
discourse and social practices. Concepts of ‘European values’, ‘European
identity’ and ‘European public sphere’ should not be treated as givens. They
should also not be understood as homogeneous and static. They are dynamic and
polymorphous, because they are constantly change and require reinterpreting.
For this
reason, research on the European public sphere, EU citizenship, identity and
values should avoid searching for simple policy solutions or focusing
methodological approaches only on monolithic perspectives. It should go beyond
the traditional understanding of citizenship, identity, law and borders as
static, fixed and permanent. Therefore, research should include close textual
interpretation and the hermeneutical analysis of legal sources.
The European
Commission developed its own ideas of European values and European identity.
Both ‘European values’ and ‘European identity’ are narrative constructs. ‘The
EU has invented a symbolic reality in order to define a set of rules and
traditions aimed at integrating the European peoples’ (Bee 2008: 434). Since
1990, European values have been constructed as the European interpretation of
universalist values of human rights, democracy and rule of law. According
Viviane Reding, a former European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights
and Citizenship:
Owing to our history, we in
Europe often have a different sense of values and fundamental rights than in
the USA, as evidenced above all by our reflection of the death penalty and the
importance attached to data protection in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
We in Europe also have a different view of the relationship between the market
and the state (Reding 2012).
The European identity6was established by the Declaration on
European Identity (1973).7Defining
European identity within the framework of this document involves taking into
account the dynamic nature of European unification and reviewing the common
heritage. A collective identity in the EU can subsequently stimulate the
formation of a European public sphere. Eriksen emphasizes that the public
sphere is not missing in the EU as there are new social movements, identity
politics and European audio-visual spaces such as newspapers, television and so
forth (Eriksen 1999).
However, the
public sphere should not be considered a homogeneous category defined by
borders. There are different public spheres in the EU: local, regional,
national, European, general and so forth. They are not all monolithic and they
all contain different groups. Eriksen emphasizes that pluralism of public
spheres leads to fragmentation, but that, on the other hand, more public
spheres lead to more debate, and consequently to more democracy (Eriksen 1999).
The European
Commission proclaimed 2013 as the ‘European Year of Citizens’ aimed at
encouraging public debate and informing citizens about their rights. It strove
to close the gap between European citizens and European institutions and to
strengthen the European public sphere and active EU citizenship (Van de Putte
2014). One of the objectives of the European Year of Citizens was to invite
citizens to debate on various European issues: citizens’ EU rights, the
economic crisis and the future of Europe. The European Year of Citizens sought
to encourage ‘the participation of citizens in the construction of the European
Union of tomorrow’ (European Commission 2014).
The European Year of
Citizens was complemented by a number of Citizens’ Dialogues. EU citizens had
opportunity to debate with relevant EU politicians on various European issues.
These Citizens’ Dialogues did not lead to deliberation, but only to mere debate
(Van de Putte 2014). The same can be argued regarding the European Year of
Citizens, which involved citizens who debated about their expectations for the
future of the EU and about EU rights. A tagline ‘It’s about Europe. It’s about
you. Join the debate’ remained unclear as the nature of the debate was not
precise (European Commission 2014). This tagline did not raise awareness of EU
rights despite being one of the main focuses of the European Year of Citizens
(European Commission 2014).
The speeches by the
former President of the European Commission José Manuel Barrosoon the State of the Union (2012) and by
Viviane Reding on the United States of Europe (2012) are significant for
understanding the main ideas of the European Year of Citizens 2013.8Both speeches focus on the ideas of European public space and European values
(Van de Putte 2014). Viviane Reding advocates the idea of a ‘United States of
Europe’, emphasizing ‘the specific context of European history, our values and
the unique diversity’ (Reding 2012).Reding often employs terms such as ‘our goal in Europe’, ‘we in Europe’,
and ‘our values’. She uses these terms as constatives, although they are in
fact performatives.
Representatives of
postmodern theory perceive identity as performative, not constative. Judith
Butler (1990), Jacques Derrida (1986) and a number of poststructuralist,
postmodern and queer theorists argue that identity is performative.
Consequently, identity does not pre-exist the discursive field. This means that
‘we come to understand who we are through the re-iteration or performance of
identity. In this sense, identity is not about fixed attributes possessed by
individuals, but is instead constructed in a variety of ways at a variety of
levels’ (Morgan 2000: 217).
Postmodern
hermeneutics of the subject rejects the idea of contemplative knower and
objective knowing. Interpretative situations are oriented towards the text. The
subject who interprets the text is perceived as decentred, polyphonic, and
unstable. Postmodernism celebrates heterogeneity. Both subjects (social groups)
and texts are perceived as heterogeneous. The heterogeneous character of social
groups is explained by various narratives and experiences of the group’s
representatives, which cannot be universalized and united into a single
metanarrative. On the other hand, the heterogeneous character of the text is
explained by intertextuality, whereby the meaning of the text is always shaped
by another text.
Performative
discourse dictates fixed standards and criteria and does not leave room for
difference. Poststructuralist and postmodernist authors tend to stress various
binary oppositions which represent metanarrative presuppositions, on which
various power relations are created. Poststructuralist and postmodern authors
argue about the performative character of identity, which is always constructed
by discursive practices. Thus no ‘objective’ European values and European
identity exist. Legal texts and political discourses are instruments of power
relations and constructions of identities and values. ‘While recognising the
performative and enacting quality of discourses, post-structuralist scholars
place emphasis on the concept of power’ (Carta & Morin 2014: 8).
According to Derrida,
the politics of (fixed) identity, which privileges unity, represents dangerous
ethics and politics (Caputo 1997: 13). Derrida rejects as illusion the idea of
identity based on totality and unity. He argues that linguistic, cultural and
national identities are different from themselves. This means that identity
should not be perceived as a homogeneous category. Derrida emphasizes: ‘Once
you take into account this inner and other difference, then you pay attention
to the other and you understand that fighting for your own identity is not exclusive
of another identity, it is open to another identity’ (Caputo 1997: 13).
In his article
‘Declarations of Independence’, Derrida performs a textual analysis of the
American Declaration of Independence (1776).
Derrida asks, ‘Who signs… the declarative act which founds a certain
institution’? (Derrida 1986: 8). The pronoun ‘we’ is often used in the
Declaration to speak ‘in the name of people’.
But these
people do not exist. They do not exist as an entity, it does not exist, before this declaration, not as
such. If it gives birth to itself, as free and independent subject, as
possible signer, this can hold only in the act of signature. The signature
invents the signer (Derrida 1986: 10).
Derrida argues that
‘to declare’ is a performative (not a constative), which means that the
Declaration of Independence of the United States of America ‘genuinely
constitutes the people of the United States as an independent people authorized
to sign each document’ (Owensby 1994: 193).
Derrida argues that,
on the other hand, the Declaration cannot be authorised without a previously
existing independent people. He states that the main paradox is that
‘signatures create the people who authorize the signing of the document’
(Owensby 1994: 193). Derrida shows the performative nature of the Declaration.
He argues that the Declaration creates the people, so it cannot be argued that
the Declaration is created by the people (De Ville 2008: 88). Derrida argues
that Jefferson can be considered a representative of the people in drafting the
Declaration of Independence. However, these people did not exist at the time of
drafting the Declaration. ‘It is only through the signing of the Declaration
that the people come into effect and that the representatives obtain their
legitimacy’ (De Ville 2008: 97). Derrida makes a distinction between constative
and performative.9He argues
that ‘people’ as an entity cannot exist before the act of signature of the
Declaration. Derrida argues that the Declaration is presented as a constative,
while it can only be considered to be a performative. Subsequently, it does not
have any fundamental origin.
Invention of
the ‘people’ can be ascribed both to the American Declaration of Independence
and to the European Commission’s efforts to develop the public sphere in
Europe. Both Reding and Barroso construct the European ‘we’ from the discourse
on ‘European values’. However, European values cannot exist without a
previously existing European people. Thus one can argue about the performative
nature of ‘Europeanness’ and ‘European people’ (Van de Putte 2014).
‘Europeanisation (...) is a performative intersubjective system by which
Europeans define both the European order, and themselves, based on a shared
conception of a European political community’ (Bélanger 2014: 30).
The
performative nature of Europeanisation can be concluded from the European
Commissions statement: ‘We must build up a European public space and public
opinion, so that European citizenship can be fulfilled and completed’ (European
Commission 2013: 3). Here the pronoun “we” is used in the name of “European
people”. This is another example of how the ‘signature creates the signer’.
The performative construction of European subjects
includes the binary opposition we/they. These performative references divide
‘European’ from ‘non-European’. According to Article 49 of the Treaty of the European Union, the EU is
open to all European countries. However, the term “European” remains vague and
leaves a lot of room for exclusion based on inside/outside dichotomy. The term
‘European country’ defined by the Treaty
of the European Union is mostly understood as a political community, which
shares ‘European values’. Thus, ‘European country’ is not defined predominantly
geographically. Europe as a continent is divided into ‘Europe’ and
‘non-Europe’. Countries that geographically belong to Europe are not considered
‘European’ in an economic and political sense. Thus these countries have to be
transformed into European ones, regardless of their geographical position and
of belonging to Europe as a continent. They have to share ‘European values’.
Nevertheless, the notion of ‘European’ remains vague, since there are different
conceptions of ‘European values’. From this point of view, one can also argue
about symbolic geography and European mental maps of keeping in and keeping
out. This symbolic geography stems from the performative nature of European
identity and values.
According to Van de Putte,
the use of terms such as ‘we Europeans’, ‘our values’, or ‘us’ can often be
identified in the phase of creating ‘ideology prior to policy making’ (Van de
Putte 2014: 58). In the policymaking phase, these terms often turn into ‘you’
and ‘your’.This can be identified
both in the slogan of the European Year of Citizens (‘It's about Europe. It's
about you. Join the debate’) and in the title of the EU Citizenship Report 2013
(‘EU Citizens: Your Rights, Your Future’) (Van de Putte 2014: 58). This
phrasing creates a sharp distinction between EU citizens (‘the you’) and
‘European institutions’ (‘us’), which is contrary to the European Commission's
efforts to bring European institutions closer to citizens.
Metaphysical origin of Europeanness: Creating narratives for Europe
Former
President of the European Commission José Barroso invited artists and academics
to create ‘a new narrative for Europe’10(Barroso 2013). These constructed discourses on Europe are, in fact, ‘grand
narratives’, which aim to convince people of certain truths. The concept of a ‘grand narrative’ (or metanarrative)
was introduced by Jean François Lyotard (1984). ‘Grand narrative’ is a term
often used by postmodern authors, and is thought to be a comprehensive
explanation of historical, social, political, scientific or any other kind of knowledge
or experience. ‘Grand narrative’ is a totalizing explanation of events and
concepts, which unifies them into a whole. Postmodern authors use this concept
in order to point out unifications that justify various power structures. From
the postmodern perspective, science, religion and different political theories
can all be perceived as grand narratives. Lyotard describes the ‘postmodern
condition’ as scepticism towards all kinds of totalizing and unifying
narratives that point to an ‘absolute truth’.
Grand narratives tend to ignore heterogeneity and to
unify human experience. Lyotard’s vision of politics is based on different
‘language games’11, and it
implies an idea of pluralist truth. Language games construct different truths,
as embedded in different contexts. Postmodernists advocate a pluralism of
truths, discontinuity and fragmentation. They transcend grand narratives by
focusing on the diversity of human experience and specific local contexts. The
entire postmodern project aims at liberating various social groups, cultures
and identities from the terror of totalizing metanarratives. The fall of grand
narratives has led to the emergence of the postmodern fragmentary and shifting
notion of identity. ‘Postmodern perspectives on the political have tended to
adopt non‐topographical
conceptions which are dynamic and fluid. Rather than focusing on institutions,
these perspectives have highlighted discursive, linguistic, psychological and
performative moments of political action’ (Squires 1998: 121).
Critics of grand narratives do not deny the existence of truth. They
emphasize that the truth is always institutionally produced and cannot be
separated from its contextual framework. However, some critics of Lyotard’s
idea of the ‘postmodern condition’ find it to be inconsistent. and argue that
the critique of grand narratives can be perceived as a grand narrative itself
(Habermas & Benhabib 1981). Nevertheless, this point of view is based on a
misunderstanding of postmodernism and tends to create a unifying metanarrative
of shifting, fragmented and polyvalent postmodernist ideas and concepts.
The
postmodern approach offers an expanded, alternative idea of the political. As
Foucault points out, instead of perceiving power as being based on
prohibitions, use of power should be observed as producing a whole range of
meanings, identities, bodies, knowledge, beings and actions (Foucault 1984).
The meaning is found in the discursive practices that are produced, disputed
and transformed in socio-historical actions, rather than in a sui generis scheme of timeless
categories. Postmodern theory is shaking homogenous, coherent and monolithic
modernist constructions based on reason, and postmodernists question
metaphysics based on the logos.
Postmodernists believe that homogeneous and fixed identities produce violence
and repression, questioning the naïveté and groundlessness of every identity
that excludes otherness. As an anti-foundationalist view that includes multiple
and shifting identities, postmodernism represents not only the context in which
EU citizenship can be studied, but also a source of criticism of essentialist
claims of European citizenship, identity and values.
Definitions of European identity, European values and
the European public sphere may be perceived as grand narratives. Both European
identity and European values are grand narratives that transcend the plurality
of Europe (Delanty 2010). ‘By improving debate and dialogue between
institutions and citizens, the Commission is still trying to develop a new kind
of democratic imagined community in which governing takes place in a dialogic
environment and in the context of a new demos’ (Bee 2008: 437). This democratic
imagined community often includes various other grand narratives that point to
a metaphysical determination of Europe. One of them is an idea of a ‘common
destiny’. Former President of the European Commission José Barroso states, ‘It
is not enough to say that we, Europeans, share a common destiny! A sense of
belonging to Europe, to a community of values, culture and interests, is
essential to forge that common destiny’ (Barroso 2014). The idea of a common
destiny of European peoples is also mentioned in the preamble of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe (2004).
Barroso also argues,
‘Europe I believe has a soul. This soul can give us the strength and
determination to do what we must do’ (Barroso 2012). The Conference ‘A Soul for
Europe’ took place in Berlin on 3 March 2014. The President of the European
Commission Jean-Claude Juncker12, José
Manuel Barroso, Martin Schulz and Guy Verhofstadt debated with writers, movie
directors and art festival organizers on how to find ‘a soul for Europe’.
However, the idea of Europe should be political, and metaphysical assumptions
should be avoided. The European Union is dynamic and polyphonic political
community and should not be based on ‘totalizing metaphysical theories about
the nature of things’ (Bridges 1994). The concept of the European Union within
European political discourse should be revised in order to move towards the
postmodern political standpoint which does not base its concepts on
metaphysical and moral assumptions, but on a political and constructivist
approach which emphasizes heterogeneity and multiple identities.
Conclusion
This
paper examines the deliberative character of the European Commission’s Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate
and the European Year of Citizens. I have argued that deliberation leads
towards an active and more inclusive citizenship. However, deliberation is
reduced to a mere debate within the framework of Plan D and within the framework of the European Year of Citizens. The European Commission’s Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate failed,
because it employed homogeneous and static concepts of the public sphere and
European values. In this way it reduced deliberation to a mere debate. The
European Year of Citizens was not sufficiently successful for the same reason.
It involved citizens who debated about EU rights, but it did not produce
deliberation. The tagline ‘It’s about Europe. It’s about you. Join the debate’
remained unclear, since the nature of the debate was not precise (European
Commission 2014). This tagline did not raise awareness of EU rights, despite
being one of the main focuses of the European Year of Citizens. Both Plan D and the European Year of Citizens
did not fulfil their aim to close the gap between European citizens and
European institutions. This paper emphasized the performative nature of
European values and European identity. Performative discourses exclude subjects
who do not relate to a fixed definition of European identity and values.
This
paper also shows the performative nature of ‘European identity’, ‘European
values’ and ‘Europeanness’. These concepts should not be understood as givens.
They are produced by various discourses and may also be perceived as persuasive
and convincing grand narratives. Methodologically speaking, one cannot persist
with a postmodern model of citizenship when considering some binary oppositions
which are difficult to dismiss, namely: European/non-European, self/other,
citizen/alien, and so on. Postmodernism applied to European studies primarily
refers to the idea of polyphonic and fluid identities, in order to solve the
problem of ‘internal outsiders’ in the EU. Thus, applying postmodern idea of identity
to EU citizenship and European identity requires decentralization, as well as
recognizing and rejecting essentialist elements. These elements are ones that
lead to the homogenization of concepts of ‘European values’, ‘European public
sphere’ and so on by denying and ignoring the contribution of the other and alterity in the process of creation of these concepts.
It is a fact that European Union
citizenship recognizes multilayered and flexible identities within
anthropological, philosophical, historical and political studies. However,
European public political discourse often ignores or fails to sufficiently
emphasize the polyphonic nature of European identity and values.
Notes
1 It is often argued that the democratic deficit is
due to the lack of a European public sphere, European political parties and
representative accountability (Eriksen 1999).
2Citizens Conference on
New Regional and Urban Sustainability Approaches in Europe, 2005; Meeting of
Minds – European Citizens’ Deliberation on Brain Science 2005/06; European
Citizens’ Consultation on the Future of the EU 2006/07, European Citizens’
Panel on Rural Areas in Future Europe, 2006/07 and so forth.
3 The European Commission
supported another project of deliberation in 2007, called 'Tomorrow’s Europe'.
This was a European Deliberative Poll, which included 27 Member States and
their citizens.
4By this date the Treaty of Lisbon was already drafted.
5'In seeking to promote
a common framework, the Commission fully recognises that each debate has its
own local, regional and national characteristics. Different issues will be
highlighted and the importance of the European Union will differ according to
the country and policy content discussed' (EuropeanCommission2005).
6Although the concept
of European identity defined in this document can be criticized, it cannot be
denied.
7At the Copenhagen
Summit of 14 and 15 December 1973, the Heads of State of the nine Member States
of the enlarged European Community adopted this document.
8 Both texts were
presented on the European Commission’s website as references for the main ideas
of the European Year of Citizens 2013 (Van de Putte 2014: 43)
9Constantive
describes what already exists. On the other hand, in a performative speech act the language performs the action it
describes. It embraces promises, getting married, giving a gift, making a bet,
and so on.
10 ‘The New Narrative
for Europe’ Pilot Project was launched at the Center for Fine Arts (BOZAR) in Brussels
in 2013. José
Manuel Barroso,
President of the European Commission, was joined by Commissioners Viviane Reding
and Androulla
Vassiliou and 100 civil society leaders to initiate this
project.
11 The idea of language games is was introduced by Ludwig Wittgenstein
(1953).
12 Jean-Claude Juncker
was candidate for this position at that time, while the President of the
European Commission in March 2014 was José Manuel Barroso.
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