On Reconciling Care
and Justice: An Interview with Tove Pettersen
Tomasz Jarymowicz1
Department of Philosophy, UiT The Arctic University of
Norway, tomasz.jarymowicz@uit.no
Introduction
Tove Pettersen is a professor of
philosophy at the Faculty of Humanities, University
of Oslo, Norway. Her research interests include
feminist philosophy, moral philosophy and ethics,
especially the ethics of care and the existential
ethics of Simone de Beauvoir. She also conducts
research on the history of philosophy, political
philosophy, phenomenology, existential philosophy
and postmodern philosophy.
Throughout
her career, Pettersen has published
extensively in top-rated journals, including Hypatia,
Health Care Analysis, and Simone de
Beauvoir Studies. She is also the author
of one of the most popular textbooks on
feminist theory for Norwegian humanities
students, Filosofiens annet kjønn (The
Other Sex of Philosophy) published in 2011 by
Pax. To date her most extensive work on the
ethics of care is Comprehending Care.
Problems and Possibilities in the Ethics of
Care, published by Rowman &
Littlefield in 2008. The book is an
illuminating attempt at understanding the
relationship between the ethics of care and
justice in a novel way.
The interview starts from a historical
perspective that traces the development of the
ethics of care from Carol Gilligan’s seminal
work on the moral development of women as
distinct from that of men. Gilligan’s
work spurred a wave of new research whose aim
was to reclaim morality for women’s
experience. Pettersen argues for a novel
understanding of the relationship between care
and justice that would reconcile these two
values. She then tries to illustrate her point
by discussing the dynamics of care and justice
in the medical professions, arguing that
without balancing these two values it is not
possible to achieve a greater measure of
equality both within caring professions and
between health care providers and their
patients. In the closing section we look at
how justice and care can be complementary in
the public sphere.
The
Historical Development of the Ethics of Care
Jarymowicz: Nowadays, the ethics
of care is a well-established field
in philosophy. You yourself have
been working with this concept for
over 10 years2.
However, it was not always like
that. Women’s perspectives on
morality were routinely disregarded
or, even worse, women used to be
considered as not being able to
attain full moral development. That
was the privilege of men. What,
then, is the intellectual history
behind the development of the ethics
of care?
Pettersen: We could start with 1982,
which is the year Carol Gilligan’s In
a Different Voice3 was published.
This book is considered by many to be
the start of the feminist ethics of
care. Gilligan was not a philosopher,
but a moral psychologist, and she was
working with Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg
is quoted by John Rawls in his Theory
of Justice, when Rawls wants to
depict how agents mature morally (Rawls
1971: 461). Kohlberg was interested in
moral development, and carried out
several empirical studies on this
problem.4
He suggested that moral reasoning develops
in stages, each one more advanced than the
previous one, with stage six marking the
highest level of moral development. Stage
six is very similar to Kantian moral
reasoning, which is not very surprising
given that Kohlberg himself admitted that
he was very much inspired by the Kantian
concept of morality. According to
Kohlberg, at the highest stage of moral
development one is capable of applying an
abstract principle to a particular case.
This signifies moral maturity. The
interesting thing here was that when women
were included in his empirical studies,
they systematically failed to score high.
They were on average one stage behind men.
Gilligan would not accept the way the
gathered data was interpreted. She agreed
that there were gender differences in how
women answered questions concerning moral
dilemmas, but she did not accept that
their answers were less mature. This
actually initiated Gilligan’s own
empirical research.
Gilligan decided to interview
women because she wanted to more closely
explore the gender differences in terms of
moral reasoning. Kohlberg simply concluded
that women did not attain the highest
stages of moral development without paying
attention to the differences between the
attitudes of women and men. Gilligan did
her research on how women typically apply
reasoning in situations that pose moral
challenges. She found that there were
statistically significant differences
between the ways both sexes solved moral
problems. One of the striking differences
was that the women’s main ethical concern
was care, while the men’s main concern was
justice. Furthermore, when women were
solving problems, an important strategy
was to contextualize the problem. They did
not strive to find an abstract principle,
and then apply it to a particular case, as
men were inclined to do. The women
attempted to see the problem in a wider
perspective: they wanted information
regarding the circumstances. Before they
answered the question on how to act, they
attempted to get contextual information.
Therefore, instead of relying on
pre-established principles, they asked
questions, such as: Why do the agents find
themselves in this situation? Are there
any other persons that can help us out of
this situation? Can we find a new
solution? This form of moral reasoning was
nevertheless considered to be immature
from the traditional perspective. Gilligan
insisted that women should not be
considered less mature. They had just a different
approach because they were committed to a
different value, namely care.5
After the publication of In
a Different Voice, there was a
huge debate about whether the purported
differences between sexes could be
generalized. For example, why do women
in this research behave differently? Is
it something biologically determined? Is
it cultural? It is worth noting that
Gilligan was not explaining the gendered
differences in moral reasoning in
essentialist terms, she argued these
differences were cultural constructions.
Gilligan did not fully pursue the
implications that her findings could
have for moral philosophy. She left us
with her findings, which implied that
both moral philosophy and moral
psychology were deeply male-biased, and
that we had been overlooking very
important ethical aspects because the
Kantian style of reasoning was supposed
to be common to everyone. This is when
feminist philosophers picked up on the
topic. This is also the topic on which I
focused my PhD thesis, which in turn led
me to write the book Comprehending
Care
(2008). My main concern was how these
findings
on women’s moral reasoning could be
developed into a normative theory, and
what kind of ethical theory this would
amount to. How would it differ from
virtue ethics, from consequentialism,
and other moral theories? Several
feminist philosophers have been working
on the ethics of care since the
publication of Gilligan’s book, and they
have continued to articulate and develop
the unique moral outlook that Gilligan
first identified. When Gilligan did her
research more than 30 years ago, the
ethics of care was non-existent. Today
the ethics of care has taken its
rightful place among other normative
theories.
The Ethics of
Care and
Justice
Reconciled
Jarymowicz:
When
it comes to
the
relationship
between the
ethics of care
and
traditional
moral theories
of justice,
there are, as
you describe
in your book6,
three
approaches:
the first one
is “mutual
exclusivity”,
the second one
is
“compatibility”,
and the third
one is
“incommensurability”.
Now, you try
to understand
the relation
between care
and justice as
“reconcilable”.
Pettersen:
Yes. These two
values are
neither
opposed to
each other,
nor can one
replace the
other. Care
and justice
are like two
sides of the
same coin. In
my work I have
tried to
elaborate on
the concept of
care. In every
normative
theory there
is a core
concept. For
example, if
you are
interested in
justice, you
have to know
what justice
is. If you are
going to work
on virtue
ethics, you
need to know
what a virtue
is. So if you
want to
concentrate on
care you must
identify some
characteristics
of care. When
I started
working on the
concept of
care, I
realized that
there was a
traditional
and widespread
understanding
of care in our
culture that
overlapped
with Christian
ethics,
traditional
nursing
ethics, and
also with
cultural
conceptions of
what it means
to be a woman.
The common
denominator in
all those
traditions was
care being
conceived as
an act of
unconditional
giving, and
associated
with
self-sacrifice.
This is not a
feminist
concept of
care, but a
patriarchal
concept of
care. Such a
biased
understanding
cannot serve
as a core
value in a
feminist
ethics. When
interests
clash, the
mature agent
has the
ability to
balance the
considerations
that
incorporate
both care and
justice, which
are related
values.
Jarymowicz:
And here comes
your criticism
of the Good
Samaritan
ideal.
Pettersen:
Exactly. I
have noticed
that within
certain
traditions,
some version
of nursing
ethics, for
instance, the
Good Samaritan
is taken to be
the
paradigmatic
example of
good care.
This way of
visualizing
care is what I
have called
altruistic
care. In
addition to
not being
suitable as a
feminist
concept, it is
not a feasible
concept within
the caring
professions,
either. It is
actually very
problematic to
hold this as
an ideal for
care in
professions
where care has
been
commercialized,
and where the
majority of
the care
workers are
women. In our
culture, the
Good Samaritan
ideal overlaps
with the
traditional
understanding
of what it
means to be a
good woman.
Female care
workers in
particular—whether
they are
mothers or
nurses—are
commonly
expected to be
altruistic, to
systematically
put the
interests of
others first,
while treating
their own
needs as
secondary and
unimportant.
Consequently,
they are
expected to
work beyond
what is
reasonable in
order to
fulfil this
altruistic
ideal. Using
the Good
Samaritan as
an ideal for
care workers
in professions
where the
employer’s
goal is to
maximize
profit and
minimize costs
paves the way
for
exploitation.
Care workers
are especially
exposed to
exploitation,
because they
have the
responsibility
for the
well-being of
vulnerable
others. In
many
situations,
care workers
simply cannot
reject this
responsibility.
It is
therefore very
important to
be aware of
how easy it is
to be
exploited when
the
traditional
images of what
it means to be
a woman, and
the
traditional
images of what
good care is,
are jointly
applied.
Unfortunately,
the Good
Samaritan
cannot be an
ideal for
contemporary
care work. The
context the
Good Samaritan
operated
within is
completely
different from
what today’s
care workers
have to deal
with. In many
respects, the
Good Samaritan
is privileged:
he had enough
time to stop,
he had a mule
available for
transportation,
and he had the
physical
strength to
lift the needy
onto his mule.
The Good
Samaritan knew
the way to the
place where
the man would
be treated.
And, most
importantly,
there was a
free bed for
the injured,
and when he
needed to stay
there some
extra days,
the Good
Samaritan also
had money
enough to pay
for his
extended stay.
This is
exactly the
opposite of
the situation
health care
workers find
themselves in
today. They do
not have
enough time or
resources, and
there are not
enough rooms.
Trying to
provide care
like a Good
Samaritan
under these
circumstances,
very often
results in
exploitation
and
self-inflicted
harm in order
to provide
care to
others.
Jarymowicz:
Is this the
reason, then,
why you stress
the need to
incorporate
justice in the
ethics of
care, which is
also an
attempt to
expose and
criticize the
gender subtext
in the
understanding
prevailing in
the medical
professions?
Pettersen:
Yes,
absolutely. I
am advocating
a feminist
ethics of
care, and
feminists are
committed to
justice.
Feminism is
gender
justice.
Obviously
justice has to
be
incorporated
into the
concept of
care in a
feminist care
ethics.
Nevertheless,
that is not
the only
reason why our
understanding
of care must
include
reciprocity
between the
person cared
for and the
care worker.
Another reason
is that an
ethics of care
is founded on
a relational
ontology. The
relational
ontology is an
assumption
about “our
being in the
world”, an
expression of
the idea that
we are all
related and
dependent on
each other.
The altruistic
understanding
of care is
based on an
individualistic
ontology,
namely that
humans first
and foremost
are separated
and
independent.
In terms of
care this
means that
care is
envisioned as
given from one
person—the
caregiver—to
another, the
care receiver.
This view of
care has many
problems: one
of them is
that it is not
sensitive
enough towards
the one in
need. If you
incorporate
reciprocity
and
relatedness
into the
comprehension
of care, the
care worker
cannot just
deliver a
service and
think that
caring has
been
completed.
There has to
be an
interaction.
The one caring
has to listen
to what the
one in need of
care wants,
and in what
way they want
it. That is
one side of
it. The other
side is, when
integrating
reciprocity,
the one in
need of care
cannot demand
too much from
the care
worker. Care
workers should
not be
exploited. So
there has to
be
reciprocity,
and the ideal
of care must
be that both
parties are
entitled have
their vital
interests and
needs attended
to and
respected.
This
understanding
of care is
what I term
mature care in
Comprehending
Care, and
have discussed
in several
articles,
including in
“Conceptions
of Care:
Altruism,
Feminism and
Mature care”
published in Hypatia
in 2012.
The
Ethics of Care
in Medical
Settings
Jarymowicz: Do you think
that the
popularity of
the ethics of
care is
growing in
caring
professions?
Would that be
a sign of a
more
humanizing
trend in those
professions?
Pettersen: I think there always has been a
strong
interest in
the ethics of
care within
the medical
professions,
but
predominantly
in what I term
the altruistic
version of
care ethics.
Unfortunately,
this version
of care ethics
prolongs and
sustains many
problems
within the
caring
professions.
In my view,
incorporating
a feminist
care ethics
into the
caring
professions
would be a
step in the
right
direction.
Jarymowicz: Is it the case,
then, that one
of the merits
of
incorporating
the ethics of
care into the
medical
professions
would be
enhancing
equality
within health
care
institutions
and between
health care
providers and
their patients
alike? This
would more
readily
address
problems
connected both
with
paternalism of
the medical
professions
and excessive
demands placed
on health care
workers by
their
institutions’
management.
Pettersen: Yes, and that is why reciprocity
must be
integrated in
our
understanding
of care. Care
can be very
paternalistic,
if it is
one-sided. It
can also be
very
exploitative,
if the patient
or your
partner feels
entitled to
your entire
caring
capacity.
Reciprocity is
an important
element of
mature care.
There is also
one other
point that I
find very
important, as
we are talking
about
equalizing
care, and care
being mature:
If you attend
only to your
own needs,
that is not
being mature.
However,
devoting
yourself
completely to
satisfying the
needs of
another person
is not being
mature,
either. To
devote
yourself
totally to the
needs of the
other is to
take no
responsibility
for your own
life, for your
own needs. It
amounts to
following
others
blindly. As I
see it, a
moral agent is
mature only
when she is
capable of
articulating
and attending
to her own
needs, while
at the same
time being
aware of the
needs of
others, and
able to take
them both into
consideration
when acting.
This is what
it means to be
mature.
Jarymowicz: Yes, but also
not to only
focus on
formal rules
of Kantian
morality?
Pettersen: True. Being mature means to be
able to
integrate both
reason and
emotion into
our moral
judgement. If
you feel
repulsed by
caring for
someone, one
should be
aware of, and
reflect on,
this
emotion—but
not
necessarily
act on it.
Both reason
and emotions
have to be
listened to
before acting.
That is also
to be mature.
In my view,
either to
always act on
emotion, or to
never take
emotions into
account, is to
be equally
immature.
The
Ethics of Care
and Justice in
the Public
Sphere
Jarymowicz: It is perfectly
understandable
that the
ethics of care
is very
important in
the public
sphere, for
example, in
the medical
professions.
But there is
also a
criticism that
there is a
kind of limit
to the
usefulness or
desirability
of the ethics
of care in a
public sphere.
One of the
reasons is
that it is so
heavily based
on the image
of a mother
and a child,
which invokes
the risk of
paternalism.
Would you
agree that
perhaps there
are some areas
in the public
sphere that
are more
justice-friendly,
and that there
are some areas
in the public
sphere that
are more
ethics-of-care-friendly?
Pettersen: Absolutely. In the early 1980s,
when the
ethics of care
was really
new, it was
debated
whether care
or justice was
to be
considered the
most
fundamental
value. But you
know, just
like we need
both freedom
and equality
to lead a good
life, we also
need both care
and justice.
Sometimes
these two
values
conflict with
one another,
sometimes they
do not. And
when they do,
one has to
work hard to
figure out
which values
are going to
prevail in
this
particular
case. At
times, this is
very
difficult. In
some spheres
of society,
for example in
legislation,
courts, and
hiring
practices,
obviously
justice
dominates.
Jarymowicz: But I think that
the very
substance of
legislation
must take both
justice and
care into
account. For
example, the
way the legal
system should
treat a
witness such
as a woman who
has been
raped. The
perpetrator
has the right
to a just
trial, but one
also needs to
avoid
inflicting
more harm on
the woman,
such as by
subjecting her
to repeated
interrogation.
Pettersen: Justice can be fulfilled in a
more or less
caring way,
and laws can
be enforced in
a caring or a
non-caring
way. In the
spheres where
care
dominates,
such as in
family and
friendship,
care can be
exploited, as
well as be
suppressive,
if justice is
absent. So
these two
values are
both
necessary.
That is why it
is wonderful
to be in a
conference on
global justice
and be able to
talk about
care and
observe both
of the
perspectives
being
valued.
Jarymowicz: In your lecture
today you
talked about
interdependency
of the states
and how they
depend on each
other in
international
relations
including
issues such as
health care.
However, the
fact that
states are
interdependent
is
well-established
in political
theory and
political
science. My
question,
therefore, is
what might be
the
contribution
of the ethics
of care on a
global level?
Is this
contribution
confined
mainly to
humanitarian
issues?
Pettersen: When I talked about states being
interdependent
I was arguing
that viewing
international
relations from
the
perspective of
an ethics of
care provides
us with
conceptual
tools that
allow us to
grasp and
understand
global
interdependency.
The existence
of totally
autonomous
subjects who
make totally
independent
decisions is a
myth. In
international
relations,
nation-states
are often
perceived
along very
similar lines
as autonomous
agents, which
it turns out,
is also a
myth. In my
talk today I
was arguing
that the
relational
ontology that
the ethics of
care is based
on, along with
this theory’s
emphasis on
securing basic
needs and
human
flourishing,
its focus on
cooperation,
contextual
sensitivity,
and attention
to gender
issues,
provides a
very promising
approach not
only to
humanitarian
issues, but to
global issues
in general.
Jarymowicz: Will that
interdependency
in your
account entail
a duty, for
example, in
cases when a
factory in one
country emits
pollution into
another
country?
Pettersen: Yes. Because relationships create
responsibility,
and because
destroying the
environment
contradicts
the value of
care.
Jarymowicz: I would also add
that the
ethics of care
expects people
to be more
responsible
for
themselves,
because
applying
abstract rules
without taking
account of a
context is not
enough.
Pettersen: Absolutely. Within care ethics,
the concept of
mature care
can serve as a
guide for your
own reasoning,
and this
concept
encourages the
agent to take
the uniqueness
of the
situation into
account, to
listen to both
reason and
emotions, and
not neglect
the interests
of one of the
parties. The
outcome of
this
reflection is
not given in
advance. It
is, of course,
a lot easier
to act if you
have fixed and
pre-established
rules that can
be universally
applied,
allowing you
to excuse your
acts or
disclaim
responsibility
by stating
that you were
simply acting
according to
the rules.
Because there
are no such
ready-made
answers in the
ethics of
care, the
moral agent is
also expected
to be more
responsible
for her
acts—or if you
wish, to be
more mature.
Notes
1
Tomasz
Jarymowicz is
a PhD
candidate at
UiT The Arctic
University of
Norway. His
research
interests
include
deliberative
democracy
theory, theory
of free
speech, and
feminist
challenges to
liberalism.
Jarymowicz’s
last
publication
was: Free
Speech and the
Public Sphere
in Robert
Post’s Theory
of Freedom of
Expression
(pp. 2-18). In
Alnes, J.H.,
Toscano, M.
(2014).Varieties
of Liberalism.
Cambridge:
Cambridge
Scholars
Publishing.
The
interview was
held on 23
June 2013, at
UiT The Arctic
University of
Norway, on the
occasion of
the
international
conference on
Realizing
Global
Justice:
Theory and
Practice.
This interview
is part of a
series of
interviews
with the
keynote
speakers. The
conference and
the interview
series were
organized by
the Pluralism,
Democracy, and
Justice
Research Group
funded by the
Justice in
Conflict
Project
(2010-2015),
Research
Council of
Norway, in
collaboration
with the
Brazilian
magazine Filosofia
Ciência &
Vida,
edited by
Paula Palma
Félix.
2
See,
for example,
Pettersen’s
most
comprehensive
account of
ethics of care
in her Comprehending
Care,
2008.
3
Gilligan
(1982).
4
See Kohlberg
1981 vol. I
and 1984 vol.
II for the
collected
edition of his
most important
work.
5
For
a more
thorough
analysis, see
Gilligan
(1982: Ch. 1).
6
Pettersen
(2008: 94-99).
Gilligan, C.
(1982). In
a Different
Voice.
Cambridge, MA:
Harvard
University
Press.
Hem,
M. H., Pettersen,
T. (2011). Mature
Care and
Nursing in
Psychiatry:
Notions
Regarding
Reciprocity in
Asymmetric
Professional
Relationships. Health
Care Analysis 19(1): 65-76.
Kohlberg,
L.
(1984). The
Psychology of
Moral
Development:
the Nature and
Validity of
Moral Stages. (Essays
on Moral
Development.
Vol. 2). San Francisco: Harper
& Row.
Kohlberg,
L. (1981). The Philosophy of Moral Development:
Moral Stages
and the Idea
of Justice
(Essays on
Moral
Development,
Vol. 1). San Francisco: Harper &
Row.
Kohlberg,
L. (1981).
The Meaning
and
Measurement of
Moral
Development. Vol. 13. Worcester, MA: Clark
University
Press.
Pettersen,
T. (2012).
Conceptions of
Care:
Altruism,
Feminism, and
Mature Care. Hypatia 27(2): 366-389.
Pettersen,
T., Hem, M.H.
(2011). Mature
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