Climate change
denial, freedom of speech and global justice
Trygve Lavik
Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen,
Trygve.Lavik@uib.no
In this paper I claim that there are moral reasons for
making climate denialism illegal. First I define climate
denialism, and then I discuss its impact on society and
its reception in the media. I build my
philosophical arguments mainly on John Stuart Mill and
Thomas M. Scanlon. According to Mill’s utilitarian
justification of free speech, even untrue opinions are
valuable in society’s pursuit of more truth.
Consequently one might think that Mill’s philosophy
would justify climate denialists’ right to free
speech. A major section of the paper argues
against that view. The main arguments are: Climate
denialism is not beneficial because its main goal is to
produce doubt, and not truth. Climate denialism is not
sincerely meant, which is a necessary condition for Mill
to accept utterances. Climate denialists bring harm, by
blocking necessary action on climate change.
Primarily they harm future generations and people in
developing countries. Hence the case can be made in
terms of global justice: Would future generations and
people in developing countries support my claim? I think
so, or so I argue. My argument from global justice is
built on Scanlon’s distinction between the interests of
participants, the interests of audiences, and the
interests of bystanders. The climate denialists
have participant interests “in being able to call
something to the attention of a wide audience”. Audience
interests consist of “having access to expressions that
we wish to hear or read, and even in being exposed to
some degree to expressions we have not chosen”. Future
generations and people in poor countries are bystanders
to the climate debate. If the debate postpones necessary
actions, it is the bystanders who must pay the price. I
argue that bystanders’ costs outweigh participants’ and
audiences’ interests, and that this is an argument for a
statutory ban on climate denialism.
Keywords: climate change denial, freedom of
speech, global justice, utilitarianism, harm principle
Introduction
Imagine the following thought
experiment:
The pharmaceutical industry has invented a medicine
that eliminates morning sickness during pregnancy.1
The medicine has been tested, and there is no
indication that the medicine will affect the baby.
The babies that are born are normal. However, a
scientist has begun to research whether this
medicine may have potential long-term effects. Will
these babies’ lives be negatively affected as they
grow up, or when they become adults? Let us assume
that, according to other well-established medical
research, there are good reasons to believe that
these babies will suffer paralysis of the legs when
they have grown up. Experiments with animals that
reach maturity in one year also show that many of
these animals suffer paralysis when they mature. The
scientific society takes this very seriously, and
establishes a panel that reviews all the research in
the field. After reviewing all the science on the
subject, the panel concludes that it is very likely
that this medicine will have the very dangerous
adverse effect described above. Furthermore, the
academes of science in all the leading countries
have approved the scientific reasoning and support
the conclusion of the panel. However, at the same
time, the pharmaceutical industry launches a
campaign to create doubt about the scientific
conclusion that has been reached through research.
They establish quasi-scientific institutes and hire
acknowledged scientists to argue that the science is
not settled at all. Moreover, they initiate a
petition that completely denies that this medicine
might have dangerous long-term effects. They pay a
lot of scientists to sign the petition. The media
want to be fair and balanced, so they present both
sides of the issue. The result is that many women
continue to take the medicine during pregnancy.
Twenty years later, tragedy strikes. The legs of the
children of the mothers who took this medicine
during pregnancy become paralyzed. The question now
is: is it reasonable to claim that someone has
committed a crime against these children? And if so,
is this not an argument for introducing a law
prohibiting this kind of crime? I believe so, and in
this paper I will argue that climate denialists
commit a crime similar to that of the fictive
pharmaceutical industry denialists in my thought
experiment.2
The claim I will defend in this paper is that there
are moral reasons for making climate denialism
illegal. I shall first describe climate denialism
and then discuss the impact of climate denialism and
the role of media (sections 1-3). Then I shall
discuss the usefulness and harm of climate denialism
and then claim that climate denialism should be
prohibited (sections 4-5). In the final section, I
will discuss some problems with enacting a law
against climate denialism (6).
I. What is Climate Denialism?
Fredrick Seitz is a former
president of the US National Academy of
Sciences (NAS). In 1998, Seitz wrote a
document (later called the Oregon
petition) in which he denied the central
theses of man-made global warming. He
deliberately printed it in the font and
format of the Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences,
the journal of the NAS. The NAS council
soon after released a statement saying
that NAS had nothing to do with the
document, and that the academy was worried
about the confusion this document had
caused. According to the petition’s home
page, 31,487 scientists have signed this
petition.3
The Oregon petition was long ago exposed
as a fraud. Most of the signers were not
scientists at all, and many of them did
not know that their names were on the
list. Despite this, the Oregon petition is
still very much alive (Monbiot 2006:
29-31). The Oregon petition is one example
of the so-called “denial industry”. This
term, introduced by George Monbiot,
describes the well-organized and
well-funded campaign by a handful of
scientists, free-market think tanks and
industry to produce doubt about climate
change (Monbiot 2006: 20-42). Denial
campaigns against science did not occur
for the first time with the theory of
global warming. In the book Merchants
of Doubt (2010), Naomi Oreskes and
Erik Conway demonstrate how a handful of
scientists have obscured the truth on
issues like tobacco smoke, acid rain,
ozone holes, second-hand smoke and global
warming. The story they tell is about a
small group of scientists, who in
collaboration with right wing think tanks
and industry, have run a successful
campaign to mislead the public about
science.
Many would probably say that this small
group of scientists do us all a favour.
Scepticism is a good thing in science, and
in public debate. A sceptic is a person
who does not accept truths just because an
authority or a majority believes so: he
wants to hear all the arguments. However,
he is no longer a sceptic if he does not
respect the force of the better arguments.
In this paper, I will argue that while
sound scepticism is a good thing in
science and public debate, denialism is
not, and there is a big difference between
scepticism and denialism.
So how is it possible to distinguish
between scepticism and denialism? I
propose that the distinction can be made
with the help of the concept of “good
faith”. To be in good faith means to be
sincere. But how can we know whether
someone is sincere or not? We cannot look
in to other people’s minds. To answer this
question it is instructive to consider how
good faith is treated in law. In law, good
faith does not mean what you actually
think or what you claim to know and not
know. It means what you under certain
circumstances should
know. If you for example buy jewellery
from a drug addict on the street, you
might claim that you acted in good faith,
and perhaps you also did not know better,
but under such circumstances you should
have known better. You are not acting in
good faith. To make this point clearer I
will also bring in another concept from
law, namely the principle of “caveat
emptor”: let the buyer beware. For
example, when you buy a flat you have a
duty to investigate the property for sale.
Let us say a man named Bob buys a flat.
After Bob has lived there for some weeks
he discovers mould in a wall. Bob
complains to the salesman and asks for a
price reduction. The salesman refuses to
pay, and Bob takes the case to court. In
court Bob claims that he acted in good
faith when buying the flat. He really
believed that it was a flat without
defects. Bob loses the case, because he
should have inspected the flat and thus
known that the flat had a defect.
The distinction between being in good
faith and not being in good faith is
useful to explain the difference between a
sceptic and a denier. A sceptic acts in
good faith, a denier does not. If a denier
claims that climate scientists do not take
sun activity in to consideration, he is
not in good faith. He should have
investigated what climate scientists say
about the subject first. My distinction
between scepticism versus denialism
reflects a central definition of climate
denialism. Michael Shermer argues that
denial is the “automatic gainsaying of a
claim regardless of the evidence for it”
and that “denialism is typically driven by
ideology and religious belief” (Shermer
2010: 36). Shermer is of the opinion that
the so-called climate sceptics are mostly
deniers, and not sceptics at all, because
scepticism entails taking a scientific
approach to the evaluation of claims.
Washington and Cook say that: "…refusing
to accept the overwhelming “preponderance
of evidence” is not scepticism; it is denial
and should be called by its true name"
(Washington & Cook 2011: 2).
Stefan Rahmastorf has
devised a typology of climate sceptics
that has been adopted by many
commentators. He distinguishes between
three levels:
- Trend
sceptics:
those who deny the warming trend;
- Attribution sceptics:
those who accept the trend and
attribute it to natural causes;
- Impact sceptics: those
who accept human causation of the
warming trend but claim that the
impacts will be beneficial or benign
(Washington & Cook 2011: 11).
Although it is impossible to
predict the precise impact of global
warming, the “predictions in broad terms
are clear” (Broome 2012: 31), and there is
no doubt that climate change will harm
millions of people. This typology can be
combined with the distinction between
climate sceptics and climate deniers. Let
us imagine a dinner party comprising four
climate scientists, and four climate
sceptics. First, they discuss whether
there is a warming trend or not. After a
while, three of the sceptics recognize the
better arguments, and accept that the
planet is getting warmer. The fourth
sceptic refuses to give up his position,
even though he no longer has any
arguments. Then the party goes on to
discuss whether this warming trend is
human induced or not. After a while, two
of the sceptics recognize the better
arguments. The third sceptic refuses to
give up his position, even though all the
arguments prove him to be wrong. The same
story repeats itself when they discuss the
impact
of man-made climate change. At the end of
the party, only one of the initial
“sceptics” is still a sceptic, the three
others have proved themselves to be
deniers.
This dinner party is an analogy to the
climate debate in the public. And the
denial industry can be compared with the
three deniers at the party. None of these
deniers are acting in good faith, they are
not sincere. The fact that the activities
of the denial industry are dishonest is
well documented. The strategy used by
climate deniers is very much like the one
used by the tobacco deniers. Many of the
same people who were engaged in the denial
of tobacco are also involved in the denial
of climate change (Oreskes & Conway
2010, Monbiot 2006: 31). No one has
formulated this strategy better than they
have themselves: “Doubt is our product”,
proclaimed an internal tobacco industry
document in 1969. “Spread doubt over
strong scientific evidence and the public
won’t know what to believe” (Saloojee
& Dagli 2000: 9003).
When proposing a ban
on climate denialism, it is necessary to
distinguish illegal climate denialism from
legal climate denialism. In this paper,
“illegal climate denialism” will mean “a
well-organized and well-funded campaign by
a person or group with authority in
society, which keeps repeating the same
untrue and damaging claims about climate
change, without mentioning conclusive
counter arguments”. The Oregon petition,
and its legacy, is a clear example of
climate denialism that can be subsumed
under this definition. I will also give
another example: The Hartland Institute is
a right-wing think tank and lobby group
that receives massive financial support
from Exxon Mobil. In 2007, the Hartland
Institute published a list of 500
scientists who were said to deny
human-induced climate change. Shortly
afterwards, many of the scientists
declared that they had been falsely cited,
and they demanded that their names be
taken off the list immediately. By 2009
none of the names had been removed from
the document (Monbiot 2009). Finally, the
so-called “climate gate” campaign is
another example that clearly can be
subsumed as illegal climate denialism.
However, some phenomena should not be
considered illegal, such as a climate
scientist who publishes peer-reviewed
articles that deny man-made climate
change, and a layman who writes climate
denial opinion pieces in newspapers, or
participates in the climate denial
blogosphere, and so on.
II. Is the denial industry a
reason for inaction on the
climate problem?
George Monbiot
(a recognized environmentalist
and author) writes that “the
professional denial industry
has delayed effective global
action on climate change by
several years (Monbiot 2006:
39).4
Philosopher Philip Kitcher
thinks that “climate deniers
have successfully blocked
attempts to introduce policies
for coping with potential
environmental change”(Kitcher
2011: 243). I take it that
Monbiot and Kitcher implicitly
reason as follows: the denial
industry spreads
misinformation through
newspapers, radio and
television. This
misinformation deceives a
major portion of the public.
Hence, the majority do not
think that climate change is a
big problem. And the result is
that people do not put
pressure on governments to
act. However, there are many
objections to this line of
reasoning. I will address
three of them:
a) There is not
much climate denialism among
people;
b) The lack of
political action causes
apathy in the public;
c) There is no
causal link from climate
denialism in the media to
climate denialism among
people.
a) There is
not much climate denialism
among people:
TNS Gallup has recently
conducted a survey on climate
change notions in Norway.
Among “major challenges facing
Norway” people rank climate
change number six, behind
health care, schools and
education, immigration and
integration, expanding roads
and railroads, and increasing
violence and crime (TNS Gallup
2011).
In the same survey, people
were asked whether they had
confidence in the conclusions
of the IPCC. The results were
|
Very high trust
|
8%
|
|
High trust
|
26%
|
|
Some trust
|
41%
|
|
Low trust
|
12%
|
|
Very low trust
|
7%
|
|
Don’t know
|
7%
|
Table 1:
TNS Gallup
2011
Only
one-third of the respondents
had very high/high confidence
in the conclusions. In the
survey, 41% said they thought
that the IPCC is influenced by
politics, while 33% held that
the IPCC is independent. The
rest (26%) said they “don’t
know”. The survey also showed
a decline in the belief that
climate change is man-made. In
the autumn of 2009, 74%
totally/partially agreed that
climate change is
human-induced, while in the
autumn of 2011, 65 %said that
they totally/partially agreed
that climate change was
man-made. This may seem like a
high score. However, many of
the 65% just partially
agree. A survey conducted by
YouGov showed that almost half
of the Norwegian population
believe that the climate
problem is exaggerated (NRK
2010). Moreover, in another
recent survey 42% of the
respondents totally/partially
agreed that “Climate change is
only natural variation in the
temperature of the Earth” (Andersson 2012 in Bergens Tidene).5
Conclusion: there is
increasing climate denialism
among people.6
b) The lack of political
action causes apathy in the
public:
Another objection is that
climate deniers are not those
who cause apathy in the
public; instead, it is the
lack of political action. The
argument goes: the public see
that politicians are not
trying to solve the problem.
They therefore think that
politicians do not believe
global warming is a big
problem. The conclusion drawn
(by a large part of the
public) from all this is that
climate change is not a big
problem.
There are several problems
with this explanation. One
premise is that people regard
their politicians as the most
important authorities on
questions concerning what to
believe about the world: for
example, that a politician is
more authoritative on
scientific issues than a
scientist. Another problem
arises if we try to turn this
explanation into a
deductive-nomological model of
explanation:
L
If the public
perceive that their leaders
are not trying to solve an
assumed problem X, the
public will tend to believe
that X is not a serious
problem.
C
Their leaders
do not make any effort to
solve the problem X.
E
The public do
not believe that X is a
serious problem.
Let us then replace “X” with
“health care”, “crime”,
“immigration” or “roads”. It
is then apparent that this
explanation cannot be
generally valid. Thus, it can
hardly explain the widespread
belief that the climate change
problem is being exaggerated.
One could argue that in
matters like health care,
crime, immigration and roads,
people see and experience the
problems themselves, for
example when they watch the
evening news, or drive over a
bump in the road. So if the
politicians do not act, they
still know that the problems
remain unsolved. The problem
with this objection is that it
introduces another argument:
the reason why people do not
believe in climate change is
because they cannot see or
experience the problem
first-hand. But this
explanation is quite different
from that which explains
disbelief as a result of a
perceived lack of political
action.
c) There is no causal link
from climate denialism in
the media to climate
denialism among people:7
A major problem
in recognizing climate change
as a big problem is that
people cannot directly
experience it. This
explanation, which is almost
self-evident, is based on
human psychology. Human
psychology is probably the
most important source of
climate denialism. Short-term
thinking, self-deception, and
the unwillingness to sacrifice
achieved goods are all human
vices. Many people would most
probably have become climate
deniers even without the
denial industry. However, it
does not follow that the
denial industry has no impact.
These human vices provide
fertile ground for promoting
climate denialism. The fact
that there is fertile ground
for denial among people is not
a strong case for claiming
that the denial industry does
not have any effect on
people’s thinking. That would
be similar to saying that
advertising agencies do not
have any impact merely because
there is already demand for
the products (for example,
face moisturizer) in the
market. The denial industry
spends millions of dollars to
produce and spread climate
scepticism. They would be
wasting their money if there
was no connection between
climate denialism in the media
and public opinion. A lot of
sociological research has been
done on this subject, and
Dunlap and McCright are
crystal clear about what their
findings tell them:
The climate
change denial campaign has
been successful. Organized
and well-funded denial
efforts have convinced many
policy-members and citizens
that the scientific evidence
for human caused atmospheric
warming remains so uncertain
that regulating carbon
emissions is not urgent
(Dunlap & McCright,
2013: 2).
Conclusion: the
denial industry is a reason
for inaction on the climate
problem. However, the denial
industry could not have
achieved this without help
from the media.
III. Climate
change denial
and the media
There are at
least three
factors that
shape how the
climate
problem is
portrayed in
the media:8
1) Political dependency;
2)
Commercial
dependency;
3) The
journalistic
norm of
balance.
It is obvious
that certain
media
institutions,
such as the
Fox News
channel, are
not
independent of
political
interests in
their coverage
of climate
change
(Dimiero
2010). The
media are not
independent of
commercial
forces, since
media
institutions
need readers,
listeners and
viewers. If a
debate on
climate change
on television
presents ten
climate
scientists,
all of whom
agree that
climate change
is real,
human-induced,
and impels us
to change our
lifestyles,
the show will
probably get
bad ratings. A
debate between
one climate
scientist who
claims that
climate change
is
human-induced
and one denier
who argues
that there is
no climate
change at all
is more likely
to attract an
attentive
audience. I
believe it is
non-controversial
to
be critical of
the media’s
dependency on
political and
commercial
interests.9
The topic for
this paper,
however, is to
demonstrate
how climate
denialism is
supported by
our idealistic
norms of free
speech, as
echoed in the
journalistic
norm of
balance.
Balance
demands that
all
perspectives
on a
controversial
issue be
illuminated.
Obviously, the
climate
deniers
benefit from
the ethics of
journalism.
Ross Gelbspan
has given a
good analysis
of the
situation:
The professional canon of
journalistic
fairness
requires
reporters who
write about a
controversy to
present
competing
points of
view. When the
issue is of a
political or
social nature,
fairness—presenting
the
most
compelling
arguments of
both sides
with equal
weight—is a
fundamental
check on
biased
reporting. But
this canon
causes
problems when
it is applied
to issues of
science. It
seems to
demand that
journalists
present
competing
points of
views on a
scientific
question as
though they
had equal
scientific
weight, when
actually they
do not
(Gelbspan
1998: 57-58).
There
is nothing
wrong with the
norm of
balance in
media, but the
way this norm
has been
applied in the
coverage of
climate change
is highly
questionable.
Julius and
Maxwell
Boykoff
studied the
media coverage
of climate
change in the
USA between
1988-2004.
They found
that 53% of
the coverage
was
“balanced”,
that is, it
gave equal
time to the
majority view
of science and
climate
scepticism.
This balanced
coverage was
named “balance
as bias” by
Boykoff &
Boykoff
(2004).
The
journalistic
norm of
balance is
rooted in the
values of free
speech, which
most of us
consider vital
for the
well-being of
a democratic
society. The
common view
is, as I have
said, that
free
discussion is
always a good
thing. In the
next two
sections I
challenge that
view.
IV.
Is climate
change denial
useful in
society?
An editorial
in The
Independent
states
that:
The climate change sceptics have
done us all a
favour (…) by
challenging
the consensus
view of global
warming, the
sceptics have
tested the
flabbier
assumptions of
that consensus
and forced the
proponents of
the majority
view to
sharpen their
arguments (7
February 2010
as cited in
Painter 2011:
45).
This editorial
echoes the
values of free
speech. Free
discussion is
always a good
thing, a view
that is shared
by a majority
in democratic
countries.
However, there
are some
exceptions. In
his recent
book,
Science in a
Democratic
Society,
Philip Kitcher
contends that:
When the conditions of public
discussion
with respect
to important
and central
issues allow
for, even
foster,
widespread
states of
irremediable
ignorance (as
well as
resistance and
alienation),
asserting the
value of “free
exchange of
ideas” is no
more than the
expression of
a shallow,
habitual piety
(Kitcher 2011:
182).
In
stark
opposition to
the moral in
the editorial
in the Independent,
Kitcher claims
that: “As
things stand,
‘free and open
public
discussion’,
far from being
the expression
of democratic
values, is
actually
subversive”
(Kitcher 2011:
185).
In On
Liberty,
Mill makes a
strong case
for freedom of
thought and
expression.
Apparently,
the editorial
in the Independent
is more in
line with
Mill’s
philosophy
than with
Kitcher’s
disillusioned
remarks. I
shall now
argue the
opposite.
Mill defends
free speech as
the best means
for producing
more truth; it
is declared
useful because
he thinks it
increases the
sum of
justified
beliefs.10
I claim that
the opposite
is the case in
the current
climate
debate, so my
argument is a
Millian,
utilitarian
one. Against
this one might
argue: Mill
claims that
silencing an
untrue
utterance is
like robbing
from mankind
the
possibility to
challenge,
reconsider,
and perhaps
reaffirm our
true views. On
the other
hand, Mill
claims that,
although we
should allow
utterances
even though
they may turn
out to be
false, we
should only
accept
utterances
that are
sincerely
meant. I have
argued above
that there is
good reason to
doubt the
sincerity of
the denial
industry. Even
when
argumentation
succeeds in
refuting a
climate
denier’s
claim, climate
denialists do
not respect
“the unforced
force of the
better
argument”.
Climate change
denialists
merely
reiterate
their false
claims
whenever the
chance arises.
The result of
this activity
for the public
is not
“clearer
perception and
livelier
impressions of
truth”, but
instead doubt
and distrust.
Moreover, Mill
defines
utility as
“grounded on
the permanent
interests of a
man as a
progressive
being” (Mill
[1859] 2003:
81). This is
not compatible
with the
nature of
denialism,
which has been
defined as
“the automatic
gainsaying of
a claim
regardless of
the evidence
for
it”(Shermer
2010: 36).
So it is not
unquestionable
that Mill
would have
embraced the
denial
industry’s
right to free
speech.
However, there
are also other
aspects of
modern debates
over science
that Mill
could not have
foreseen, and
which
challenge his
utilitarian
justification
of free
speech. The
research group
The
Cultural
Cognition
Project,
led by Dan
Kahan, has
published many
studies on the
relationship
between values
and risk
perception.
They have
studied
several public
debates over
controversial
scientific
matters. One
result is that
more public
debate does
not move the
public towards
a consensus in
line with the
scientific
consensus
(Kahan and
others 2011).
In a recent
study, a team
of researchers
has
demonstrated
that it is not
people’s lack
of scientific
expertise that
hinders them
from
understanding
the scientific
claims about
climate
change. The
hindrance is
people’s
values. In
short: People
with
right-leaning
values—or
“hierarchal
individualists”
as they are
called in the
report—tend to
be less
worried about
climate change
than people
with
left-leaning
values—or
“egalitarian
communitarians”
(Kahan 2012).
The problem is
not the
ability to
comprehend
science, but
the
willingness to
accept
information
that
contradicts
our values.
Another study
points in the
same
direction.
Andrew Binder
and his
research group
have found
that more
discussion
only amplifies
initial
perceptions of
the debaters
(Binder,
Scheufele,
Brossard &
Gunther 2011).
In a news
report on ScienceDaily,
Binder is
quoted saying:
Our results demonstrate very
clearly that
the more
people talk
about divisive
science and
technology
issues, the
less likely
the two camps
are to see the
issue in the
same way. This
is problematic
because it
suggests that
individuals
are very
selective in
choosing their
discussion
partners and
hearing only
what they want
to hear during
discussions of
controversial
issues (North
Carolina State
University
2010).
These
findings
challenge
Mill’s
utilitarian
justification
of the liberty
principle. If
free
discussion
does not work,
if more debate
does not lead
to more truth,
then free
speech is not
useful.
An objection
to this
argument is
that, in the
long run,
truth will
prevail
through public
debate.
Society should
not make
exceptions for
debates that
do not seem
useful. Mill’s
justification
of free speech
is
rule-utilitarian
in spirit. It
is the rule of
free speech per se that is useful, not
necessarily
the outcome of
one single
debate. Making
exceptions
would weaken
the rule as
such. In other
words: Even if
there are many
useless
debates, most
would in the
long run lead
to more truth.
Hence, just
because a
debate is not
useful to
society is not
a sufficient
reason to ban
it. The fact
is that
climate
denialism is
not scepticism
but denialism
is not by
itself a
sufficient
reason to ban
it. There are
many other
forms of
denial in the
public, like
evolutional
denial, 9/11
denial and
tobacco denial
(Shermer 2010:
37) which
should be
acceptable in
society. So
why then ban
climate
denialism? The
reason is
simple: the
climate crisis
is not just a
single
political
problem among
many other
problems. The
potential of
catastrophe as
a result of
global warming
makes the
climate crisis
an exceptional
problem in the
history of
mankind. The
climate crisis
calls for
immediate
action, so we
cannot wait
and see if
public debate
merges with
scientific
consensus.
Climate change
will bring
harm to others
at a scale
unlike any
other event in
the human
history. This
is the topic
of the next
section.
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