



Meta-evaluation of road projects — *lessons learned from 14 projects*

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Unbalance between exante and ex-post efforts

- We spend huge resources on planning and estimating impacts that we <u>think</u> will happen
- Our knowledge of actual impacts is much more limited
- Very few projects are evaluated ex-post
- And the interest in and use of evaluation results are limited

What did we say would happen, and what happened?

- Ex-post evaluation is a central part of Concept's research activities
- A standardised evaluation framework used since 2012
- 2-5 evaluations per year
- 41 evaluations as of September 2024

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		Public project success? Measuring the nuances of success through ex post evaluation Gro Holst Volden ^{1,1} , Morten Welde ^{1,0} ^{1,1} ^{1,1}	

ABSTRACT

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definitions of successful performed as promised of a multicrimited era-

Three evaluation perspectives



A meta-evaluation of 14 road projects

The systematic description and valuation of one or more evaluations

The evaluated projects

No.	Project	Evaluated	Investment	Opened	Final cost	Road length	Project
			decision		EUR, 2023-prices	(km)	type
1	Rv 3/ Rv 25 Løten-Elverum	2024	2016	2020	675	26	М
2	Rv13 Ryfast/ E39 Eiganestunnelen	2024	2012	2020	1 375	27	M/ST
3	Rv7 Sokna-Ørgenvika	2022	2010	2014	215	18	А
4	E136 Tresfjordbrua/Vågstrandtunnelen	2021	2012	2015	230	11	A/T
5	Fv64 Atlanterhavstunnelen	2019	2005	2009	120	10	ST
6	Rv13 Hardangerbrua	2018	2005	2013	330	6	В
7	E6 Åsgård-Halmstad	2017	2003	2005	65	11	М
8	E6 Svingenskogen-Åsgård	2017	2005	2008	380	34	Μ
9	Rv519 Finnfast	2016	2006	2009	85	8	ST
10	E16 Kløfta-Nybakk	2015	2004	2007	115	11	Μ
11	E6 Riksgrensen-Svingenskogen	2014	2002	2005	150	4	М
12	E10 Lofoten fastlandsforbindelse	2014	2003	2007	210	29	А
13	Rv653 Eiksundsambandet	2014	2003	2008	160	19	ST
14	E18 Momarken-Sekkelsten	2012	2005	2007	95	7	М

* M = Motorway, ST = Sub-sea tunnels, A = primary A-roads (dual and single carriageway), B = Bridges

Main source of data: 14 evaluation reports

- Scope of work normally c. 400 hours
- Report length 50-110 pages
- Qualitative and quantitative information
- Additional data sources
 - Mini-seminar with the roads administration (August)
 - Workshop with evaluators (planned)





Most projects were completed on time

	Months	Percentage
Mean	4	4%
Median	0	0%
St.dev.	7	13%
Min	-3	-10%
Max	20	33%

Project no. (delay)	Causes of delays			
6 (20 months, 27%)	Over-ambitious schedule.			
	 Higher tenders than expected, with subsequent need for retendering. 			
2 (16 months, 24%)	Over-ambitious schedule.			
	 Postponed start-up after government approval. 			
5 (12 months, 33%)	Over-ambitious schedule.			
	 Postponed start-up due to insufficient resources with the contractor. 			
	 Demanding geological conditions (landslide and tunnel leakage). 			



Most projects delivered within budget

29% of projects had a final cost above the budget (P85) and average deviation from the target cost (P50) was +7%.

Project (overrun)	Causes of cost overruns			
	 Poor competition in the market when the contract was tendered 			
E39 Eiganestunnelen (33 %)	Inadequate design			
	 Standard creep due to new standards and regulations 			
	 Demanding geological conditions 			
	 Demanding geological conditions 			
E136 Tresfjordbrua/ Vågstrandtunnelen (26 %)	 Deposit of surplus materials not properly prepared 			
	 Demanding cooperation with the contractor 			
	 Demanding geological conditions 			
Fv64 Atlanterhavstunnelen (12 %)	• Delay			
	Underestimation			

	Min.	Max	Mean	Median	St. dev.	Proportion above
Target cost (P50)	-39%	37%	7%	3%	17%	67%
Budget (P85)	-42%	33%	-1%	-2%	17%	29%



Cost increase in the front-end

- Projects typically experienced a 30-40% cost increase during their planning stages
- Cost increase from first announcement was significant

The results are skewed



- 29% above budget
- 67% above the P50 estimate
- Only 53% of projects have final costs within +/- 1 standard deviation

These results are not as good as those of previous studies of cost performance (which have included the projects in this study): <u>https://www.ntnu.no/documents/1261860271/1262022437/Open+Access+proceedings+Journal+of+Physics_+Conference+series.pdf/2b8a8e15-1a0f-dea1-12 a387-e9b71611219b?t=1726074544666
12</u>

Ex-ante goals are typically on accessibility and travel time savings



First-order goals largely achieved



Project	Travel time	Traffic safety	Other goals
Riksveg 3/25 Løten-Elverum			
Rv13 Ryfast			
Rv7 Sokna-Ørgenvika			
E136 Tresfjordbrua/ Vågstrandtunnelen			
Fv64 Atlanterhavs-tunnelen			
Rv13 Hardangerbrua			
E6 Åsgård-Halmstad			
E6 Svingenskogen-Åsgård			
Rv519 Finnfast			
E16 Kløfta-Nybakk			
E6 Riksgrensen-Svingenskogen			
E10 Lofoten fastlandsforbindelse			
Rv653 Eiksundsam-bandet			
E18 Momarken-Sekkelsten			

But....

- Lack of ex-ante baseline makes ex-post assessment difficult
- No prioritization between goals
- Lack of consistent programme theory
- No benefits management

Poor estimated value for money ex-ante

Estimated net BCR ex-ante



- Only four projects with a positive net BCR
- Total NPV: EUR 25 million

Significantly higher value for money ex post



- Only two projects with a negative net BCR
- Total NPV: EUR 1 650 million
- Average increase in NPV (between projects): +2 300% (!)

The main reason for improved value for money is changes in appraisal assumptions

- Considerable changes in the discount rate (from 8 to 4%), analysis period (from 25 to 40 years), real price adjustment, etc.
- This can significantly impact appraisal results (see Concept-report no. 66)

=> CBAs are uncertain, and an estimated net BCR may merely be a snapshot in a constantly changing world

Few projects have significant (positive or negative) wider impacts



Summary

"The iron law of project management"?



The Norwegian results do not match those by Flyvbjerg and associates.

Concluding remarks

- Room for improvement, but Norwegian road projects deliver well on short-term targets and goals
- No one owns long-term ambitious objectives no sign of wider economic impacts
- No sign of apparent bias (no iron law...)
- Ex-post evaluation is useful for improving ex-ante planning and appraisal
- But only if the evaluation results are known and used in future projects

Some relevant references

- "Lessons from ex-post evaluation of government investment projects": <u>https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/1389/1/012025</u>
- "Cost and schedule performance in large government projects": <u>https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1315/1389/1/012027</u>
- "Learning through evaluation: the missing link in governance of projects": <u>https://ntnuopen.ntnu.no/ntnu-xmlui/handle/11250/3122283</u>
- "Public project success? Measuring the nuances of success through ex post evaluation": <u>https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0263786322000862?via%3Dihub</u>
- "Measuring efficiency and effectiveness through ex-post evaluation: Case studies of Norwegian transport projects": <u>https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2210539518300014</u>

The meta-evaluation will be published, in December, as a working paper here: <u>https://www.ntnu.no/concept/arbeidsrapporter</u>, and hopefully published in a scientific journal later

Thank you!

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